LexSHAKUNT ALA DEVI & ORS. versus CHAMRU MAHTO & ANR.
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[2009] 3 S.C.R. 85 SHAKUNT ALA DEVI & ORS. V. CHAMRU MAHTO & ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 258 of 2009) FEBRUARY 10, 2009 [Al TAMAS KABIR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.] CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: A B s. 145(6) - Application for implementation of order C passed ul 145(4) - Period of limitation - HELD: Article 137 of Limitation Act, being the residuary provision, would be applicable and since the application was filed beyond three years, High Court rightly held the same as barred by limitation - s. 6 of Specific Relief Act has no application to 0 proceedings uls 145 of the Code - Limitation Act, 1963 -; Schedule - Article 137 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.6. ss. 397(3) and 482 - Power of High Court to set aside order of revisional court - HELD: Doors of High Court to a litigant who lost before Sessions Judge in revision are not E completely closed and in special cases bar uls 397(3) can be lifted - Power of High Court u/s 482 is not subject to prohibition uls 397(3). On an application filed uls 145 of the Code of Criminal F Procedure, 1973 by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants stating that he was dispossessed by respondent no.1 from the lands in dispute within two months of the application, the Executive Magistrate, by his order dated 7.10.1994, declared possession of the appellants over the suit land. On 12.11.1997 the appellants G filed another application for restoration of possession in pursuance of the order dated 7.10.1994. The Magistrate directed restoration of possession in favour of the 85 H 86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R. A appellants. The criminal revision filed by respondent no.1 was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. On a petition by respondent no. 1, the single Judge of the High Court set aside the orders of the courts below. It was contended for the appellants that having 8 regard to the specific provisions of Sub-section (3) of s. 397 of the Code, the petition before the High Court was not maintainable; that the High Court misinterpretd the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Limitation Act, 1963 and erred in holding the application C filed by the appellants u/s 145 (6) of the Code as barred by limitation. Dismissing the appeal, the Court 0 HELD: 1.1. The object of introduction of Sub-section (3) in s.397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was to prevent a second revision so as to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors of the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases E the bar u/s 397(3) could be lifted. The power of the High Court to ente.rtain a petition u/s 482, was not subject to the prohibition under Sub-section (3) of s. 397 of the Code, and was capable of being invoked in appropriate F cases. [Para 17) [95-B-C] Rajathi v. C. Ganesan (1999) 6 SCC 326 and Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr. ( 1997) 4 SCC 241, referred to. 2.1. The provisions of the Specific Relief Act had G been misapplied by the High Court in holding that the appellants should have come for an order u/s 145(6) of the Code within six months from the date of dispossession, as provided in s.6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The said Act has no application to proceedings u/s 145 Cr.P.C. (Para 18) [95-G] H .j SHAKUNTALA DEVI & ORS. v. CHAMRU MAHTO 87 &ANR. 2.2. So far as making the application for A implementation of the order passed u/s 145(4) Cr.P.C. is concerned, since no period of limitation is prescribed, the same ought to have been filed under the residuary provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 within a period of three years from the date of the order. There B is also no explanation forthcoming as to the cause of the delay. Accordingly, even if the High Court was wrong in applying the provisions of the Specific Relief Act to the facts of the case; it has taken a correct view with regard to application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, (as the c bar thereunder) cannot be avoided and the application made by the appellants for being restored to possession in terms of a declaration made more than three years before the making of the application has rightly been rejected. [Para 21 and 22) [97-E; 98-A-B] 0 Khudiram Manda/ v. Jitendra Nath & Anr. AIR 1952 Calcutta 713, referred to. Case Law Reference: (1999) s sec 326 referred to (1997) 4 sec 241 referred to AIR 1952 Calcut
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