SHAKTI DAN versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Citation: [2007] 5 S.C.R. 673 · Decided: 26-04-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Case Partly allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

; 
SHAKTIDAN 
A 
v. 
STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
APRIL 26, 2007 
[DR. ARIJITPASAYAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860: 
s. 304 Part I-Prosecution ulss 302 and 323 I.P.C.-For causing death 
of mother-Conviction by courts below uls 302-In appeal to this Court C 
absence of intention to kill pleaded-Held: Jn view of the facts of the case 
and the principles of Law conviction uls 304 Part I would be appropriate. 
· ss. 299 and 300-'Culpable homicide' and 'Murder-Distinction 
between-Meaning and nature of-Discussed. 
Appellant accused was prosecuted for causing death of his mother. 
D 
Prosecution case was that PW-6 (brother of the accused) submitted a report 
before a Police Official (PW-11) stating that when accused was beating his 
wife, she ran away and reached the house of PW-6. His mother (deceased) 
also came there. The deceased advised the accused not to quarrel with his E 
wife. Therefore, the accused dragged her out of the house and throttled her 
neck, which resulted in her death. PW-11 after conducting preliminary 
enquiry, submitted the report of PW-6 to PW-13 (the Investigating Officer). 
The accused was charged u/ss. 302 and 323 IPC. Trial Court acquitted the 
accused of charges u/s 323 and found him guilty of the offence u/s 302. The 
conviction was upheld by High Court. 
F 
In appeal to this Court, appellant questioned the conviction. Alternatively 
it was contended that even if the prosecution version was accepted, the case 
was not covered u/s 302 IPC, as he had no intention to kill his mother. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. In the scheme of IPC culpable homicide is genus and 
'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. 
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans special characteristics of 
673 
G 
H 
674 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2007] 5 S.C.R. 
A murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. For the purpose of 
fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC 
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what 
may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form 
of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second 
may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable 
B under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the 
third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment 
provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three 
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part 
of Section 304. [Para 13) (678-D, E, F, G) 
c 
1.2. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide 
not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is 
caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms 
used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into 
minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and 
D application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used 
in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. [Para 14) (678-G; 679-A) 
1.3. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of 
Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under 
clause (2) is he knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular 
E victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal 
harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such 
harm would not in the ordinary way ofnature be sufficient to cause death of 
a person in normal health or condition. The 'intention to cause death' is not 
an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily 
F injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury 
causing the death of the jlarticular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing 
within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by 
illustration (b) appended to Section 300. [Para 15) (680-A, B, CJ 
1.4. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of 
G Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the 
intended bodily injury. It is the degree of probability of death which determines 
)o.. • 
whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. 
The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Sectio
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