SHAIK SAIDULU @ SAIDA versus CHUKKA YESU RATNAM AND ORS.

Citation: [2002] 1 S.C.R. 403 · Decided: 23-01-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

Election : 
SHAIK SAIDULU @ SAIDA 
v. 
CHUKKA YESU RA TNAM AND ORS. 
JANUARY 23, 2002 
[G.B. PATTANAIK AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955-Sections 71 and 671 (2)-
Election petition-Delay-Condonation of-Applicability of Section 5 of the C 
Limitation Act-High Court held not applicable since election petition was 
not an application within the meaning of Section 671-0n appeal-Held, 
applicable since harmonious interpretation of various provisions of the Act 
would show that election petition was intended to be an application for the 
purpose of /imitation-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5. 
D 
interpretation of Statutes-An interpretation defeating the purpose of 
the Act in cloak of technicalities not permissible. 
Words & Phrases : 
'Application '-Meaning of in the context of Section 671 of Hyderabad E 
Municipal Corporation Act, 1955. 
The question involved in these appeals was whether Section 5 of 
Limitation Act was applicable to the Election Petition filed under 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955. This question was answered 
in the negative by the High Court. Hence these appeals. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD : I. High Court was not justified in holding that the election 
petition was not an application within the meaning of Section 671 of the 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955. Sub-section (2) of Section 
F 
71 of the Act specifically provides the period of limitation for filing the G 
election petition for which sub-section (I) of Section 671 of the Act would 
be applicable to attract sub-section (2) of Section 71 thereby applying the 
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Att 1963 to the election petition 
filed under the Act. In the instant appeals, the High Court appears to have 
adopted a very technical approach by totally ignoring the purpose and H 
403 
404 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2002] I S.C.R. 
A object of the Act and the conduct of the respondents in not constituting 
the Tribunal thus preventing the aggrieved from approaching tile Tribunal 
to challenge the election by way of electjon petition. The orders of the High 
Court, being contrary to law, are thus not sustainable. (410-D-EI 
2. Even though the period of limitation for challenging the election 
B petition, under the Act, is provided vide sub-section (2) of Section 71, yet 
the Section or the Chapter in which it appears, does not stipulate as to 
the applicability or non-applicability of the provisions of the Limitation 
Act, 1963. However, Section 671, appearing under Miscellaneous 
Provisions under the Act, provides that in computing the period of 
C limitation, fixed for an appeal or application, referred to in the Act, the 
provisions of Sections 5, 12 and 13 of the Limitation Act shall, so far as 
may be, apply. Sub-section (2) of Section 671 provides that when no time 
is fixed by the Act for the presentation of an appeal or application such 
appeal or application shall be presented within 30 days from the date of 
order in respect of or against which the appeal or application is presented. 
]) 
(408-A-CI 
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 119761 2 SCR 260, 
referred to. 
3. The word "application" could be understood in generic sense as 
E a prayer made to an authority for some relief to set. aside an order of 
another authority. The Word "application" as used in Section 671 of the 
Act, would include within its embit an election petition wherein a voter 
or the candidate makes the prayer to the court and seeks the redressal of 
his grievances regarding the conduct of the elections. Holding election 
F petition not to be covered within the term "application" would amount 
to adopting a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the very 
purpose of the Act and the provisions made therein for disputing the 
authenticity and the conduct of the election. To overcome the confusion 
regarding the definition between the application and the petition, a new 
definition of an application was inserted in the Limitation Act which 
G defined it to include a petition. The object of the new definition is to 
provide a period of limitation for original application, interlocutory 
applications and petitions under special law, to which the Act has been 
made applicable. (409-G; 410-B-DI 
P. Philip v. The Director of Enforcement, New Delhi & Anr., AIR (1976) 
H SC 1185, referred to. 
.. /' 
SHAIK SAIDULU@ SAIDA v. CHUKKA YESU PATNAM [R.P. SETHI, J.] 405 
4. The harmonious interpretati

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