SHAH GUMMAN MAL versus THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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1005
SHAH GUMMAN MAL
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
February 6, l 98U
[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosH,\L, JJ.]
Custoins Act I 962, Section 135 ( 1) (b) & Erh'ence Act, 1872, Sections 106
and 114-Preniises searched-Gold 'biscuits with /oreign niarkings recovered-
Accused not disclosing identity of person who gu ve the gold-Whether court
can presume that the gold was smuggled and in1ported without permit.
An offence under section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 is punish-
able if the offender, acquires possession of or is
in
any
way
concerned
in carrying removing, depositing, harbouring,
keeping, concealing, selling or
purchasing or in any other manner deaJ.ing \vith any goods which he kno\vs
or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111.
Section 111 enumerates the categories. of goods which are imported into
India and are liable to confiscation.
The Central Excise officials searched the house of the appellant and found
in a secret chamber of an iron safe, \vhich was opened by him \'i'ith the keys
in his possession, a. bundle containing 28 gold biscuits and a half biscuit, all
of which bore foreign markings. In another secret chamber were found gold
earnings in plnstic boxes and a bundle of currency notes.
When questioned
in the presence of the witnesses he stated that he had been receiving
gold
biscuits from some unkno\vn person from Bombay and that the other artides
belonged to him and his mother.
He admitted that be had no general or
special permit from either the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control
Administrator to import or keep foreign gold. The statement of the appellant
was recorded.
Thereafter the appellant was prosecuted for offences under
Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act. 1962 and Section 85(ii)
read
with Section 8(i) of the Gold Control Act, 1968.
The Magistrate convicted and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprison~
ment for nine months under each count. On appeal, the Sessions Judge set
aside the conviction and sentence under the Gold Control Act as the requisite
sanction for prosecution was not accorded, but maintained the conviction and
sentence nnder Section 135(i)(b){ii) of the Customs Act, which order was
confirmed by the High Court in revision.
A
B
c
D
E
F
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :·
G
( 1) that if the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act is
not
available to the prosecution, then there is no legal evidence to show that
the appellant bad any knowledge or had any reason to believe that the goods
were imported or were smuggled without a lawful permit and (2) as
the
case had been going on for eight years, a lenient view on
the
question
of sentence may be taken; while on behalf of the respondent-State it was sub-
mitted that the fact that the gold bore foreign markings and was recovered
H
from the possession of the appellant who had
admitted
in his
statement
before the Customs Officers that some unknown person had given it to him,
'
1006
SUPR1~i\1E C01JR r RLPOR r~
[i 980] 2 s.c.R.
A
\Vould itself raise a suflicient presumption to
attribute
knov.·ll:dge
to
the
a.ppel11.nt that the gold i.vris
s~nuggled wilhvut any permit.
_Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: (1) The prosecuti.Jn has clearly proved the charge under Section
135(1) (b)(ii) of the Customs Act.
[1014Dl
B
(2) The sentence being one only of rigorous
imprisonment
for
nine
c
month~. there i~ no room for any reduction thereof.
[1014E-1
(3) The fact as to ho\v the appellant came into possession of the
gold
and whether it was import,~d or not being v,,·ithin the special knowledge of
the appellant, if he frriled to disclose the identity of the person who gave
him the gold, it Vias open to the Court to presume under sections 106 and
114 of the Evidence Act that the appellant kncv..· that the gold in his possession
\vas srnnggled and in1po1te<l without a permit. [lOliJE-_F]
( 4) The broad e!Icct of the application of the basic
principles
under-
lying section 106 of the Evidence A.ct would be that the onus is disch:trged
if the prosecution ndduces only so. much evidence, circumstantial or direct,
as is sufficient to raise a. presumption in its f:ivour \0vith regard to the existence
of facts sought to be proved. [1012F:
0
l.rsarda.r DauTat Rani &: Ors. v. Th~ [h1io11 of India & Or.r. [1962] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 358: Co1111r:i.uiuuer ,)f lncon1t' Tax. ,iExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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