LexSHABANA BANO versus IMRAN KHAN
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[2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 190 A SHABANA BANO V. IMRAN KHAN (Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009) B DECEMBER 4, 2009 [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.125: c Maintenance - Claim by divorced Muslim woman - Jurisdiction of Family Court - Held: Divorced Muslim woman entitled to claim maintenance from her husband under s. 125 CrPC, even after expiry of 'iddat' period, as long as she does not remarry- Beneficial legislation - Family Courts Act, 1984 D - ss. 7 and 20. Family Courts Act, 1984 - Enactment of - Object and purpose - Discussed. Appellant, a Muslim woman, filed maintenance E petition under s.125 CrPC against her husband (respondent) in the Court of Family Judge. Respondent contested the petition inter a/ia contending that appellant was already divorced by him in accordance with Muslim law and that under the provisions of the Muslim Women ~ F (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, appellant was not entitled to any maintenance after divorce and after expiry of the iddat period. The question which arose for consideration in the G present appeal was whether a Muslim divorced wife would be entitled to receive maintenance from her divorced husband under s.125 CrPC and, if yes, through which forum. Allowing the appeal, the Court H 190 SHABANA SANO v. IMRAN KHAN 191 ~ HELD: 1.1. The Family Courts Act, 1984, was enacted A with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. The Act, inter alia, seeks to exclusively provide within jurisdiction of the family courts the matters relating to maintenance, 8 including proceedings under Chapter IX of the CrPC (comprising of ss. 125 to 128). S.20 of the said Family Act makes it clear that the provisions of this Act have overriding effect on all other enactments in force dealing with this issue. Thus, a Family Court established under the said Family Act has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate C upon the applications filed under s.125 CrPC. [Paras 16, 18, 2.1 and 22] [196-H; 197-A; 198-C-D] 1.2. The appellant's petition under s.125 CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance D to be awarded under s.125 CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue to the divorced Muslim women. Even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled to claim E maintenance from her husband under s.125 CrPC after the expiry of period of iddat also, as long as she does not remarry. [Paras 27, 29 and 30] [201-D-E; G-H; 202-A] Court, Gwalior. Matter thus remanded for fresh adjudication by the Family. F Danial Latifi & Anr. v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 and Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P.& Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 785, relied on. Case Law Reference: (2001) 1sec140 relied on Para 24 (2007) 6 SCC 785 relied on Para 25 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009. G H 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A From the Judgment & Order dated 26.9.2008 of the High • Court of Judicature at Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Revision Case No. 285 of 2008. D. Mahesh Babu for the Appellant. B S.K. Dubey, Rajesh, Dharam Singh, Yogesh nwari for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Appellant Shabana Bano was married to the respondent lmran Khan according to Muslim rites at Gwalior on 26.11.2001. According to the appellant, at the time of marriage, necessary household goods to be used by the couple D were given. However, despite this, the respondent-husband and his family members treated the appellant with cruelty and continued to demand more dowry. 3. After some time, the appellant became pregnant and E was taken to her parents' house by the respondent. The respondent threatened the appellant that in case his demand of dowry is not met by the appellant's parents, then she would not be taken back to her matrimonial home even after delivery. F 4. Appellant delivered a child in her parental home. Since even after delivery, respondent did not think it proper to discharge his responsibility by taking her back, she was constrained to.file a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for sh
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