LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

SH. BAKSHI RAM AND ORS. versus SH. BRIJ LAL

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 795 · Decided: 19-07-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.M. SAHAI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

l. 
SH. BAKSHI RAM AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
SH. BRIJ LAL 
JULY 19, 1994 
[R.M. SAHAI AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.] 
B 
Hi11du Law : Hi11du Successio11 Act, 1956 :-<Jijt executed i11 favour of 
a distallt collateral-Remote rei"ersioners c/Jtil/e11gi11g t/Je gift-Compromise 
arrived at a11d decree obtained accordi11gly-Remote reversio11ers fili11g suit 
claiming t/Je property-Objection by t/Jird party as to mai11tainabi/ity of the C 
suit on tire ground that the nearer reversioners not a party-Held, cannot be 
raised-Rights of remote reversioners-Held: Remained dormant during life-
time of nearer reversioners and got activated after her death. 
One 'S' was the owner of extensive joint family property. He executed 
a gift in favour of a distant collecteral. The respondent and the appellants D 
who were the remote reversioners challenged the .same by filing a suit. The 
suit was compromised between the parties, as a result of which 15 Karnals 
and 15 Marlas i.e., 1/8th share of the land which was gifted by 'S' in favour 
of the respondent was to be given to the appellants after the death of 'S'; 
some· share was given to the brother of the respondent and some to the - E 
respondent. The suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. 
'S' died in 1964 and the appellants filed a suit for their share under 
the compromise decree. Respondent resisted the claim inter alia on the plea 
that 'L' the sister of 'S' was alive and so the appellants had no right to sue 
or recover possession of the land in dispute. The trial Court dismissed the F 
suit, but the Subordinate Judge decreed it holding that the appellant was 
entitled to recover possession in terms of the compromises decree . 
. Cn appeal to the High Court, a Single Judge confirmed the appellate 
decree holding that 'L' was not a party to the suit and the respondent could G 
not raise any objection as to the maintainability of the suit. On further 
appeal the Divisfon Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge, on the 
ground that since the decree obtained by the appellants was declaratory 
and would also benefit 'L', it did not prevent the respondent from raising 
objection that the decree being for the benefit of the entire body of 
reversioners and 'L' being nearer than the appellants, the suit was liable H 
795 
796 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 
A to be dismissed. Against this decision of the Division Bench appellants 
preferred the present appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. Admittedly the rights of the parties flowed from the com· 
B promise decree. It was not a declaratory decree as ordinarily understood. 
The rights acknowledged and declared were not only of the appellants but 
even of brothers of the respondent who were not donees, and, as such, rank 
outsider. In any cas.e the compromise decree having become final it was 
binding between the parties. Respondent could not wriggle out of its bind· 
C Ing effect. In equity a person drawing beneflt from a transaction Is not 
ptrmltted to escape from the disadvantage if any flowing from it. 
[798·G·H; 799-A-B] 
2. Law bas to promote justice. The courts of equity and justice cannot 
uphold an unfair stand. The respondent cannot be permitted to reprobate 
to bis advantage. The binding effect of the compromise decree could not be 
D taken away as It was to operate after death of the donor. May be a person 
with a better right, for instance 'L' could sue the appellants and claim the 
properly being nearer but that could not dilute either the effect of the 
compromise decree, even though in the nature of declaratory decree, nor It 
could clothe the allenee with any right to resist the claim of the remote 
E 
reversioner for recovery of possession on the ground that the next rever· 
sioner being alive the suit was not maintainable. The recovery of possession 
by the appellants could even be for the benefit of all the reversioners 
including the next reversioner, but it certainly did not adversely effect the 
suit filed by them for recovery of pussession against a third person. 
F 
G 
[799-C-E] 
3. When succession opened on the death of 'S' the donor, it would 
have been governed by the law in force. 'L' being sister and nearer than 
the appellants could claim by virtue of the decree that the right and 
interest of alienor developed on her. But if she did not claim, it could not 
recoil against the appellants and in favour of stranger. [SOO·B·C] 
Ram Chander Darak v. Ganeshdas Rathi & Ors. AIR (1984) SC 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.