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SEWARAM versus SOBARAN SINGH

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 512 · Decided: 15-09-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KULDIP SINGH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SEWARAM 
v. 
SOBARAN SINGH 
SEPTEMBER 15, 1992 
B 
(KULDIP SINGH AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.) 
Representation of the People Ac~ 1951: Sections 9A-80, 84, 103 and 
i;:, 
116-A. 
;ii 
:~:-
c 
Election-Disqualificatioit-Subsistence of contract with Appropriate 
Government-Contract awarded in individual capacity-Assignment of con-
<>.-., 
tract not permissible except with written approval of competent 
authority-Plea by elected candidate that contract was assigned to a firm-No 
evidence as to assignment of contract-Contract continued through the proxy 
D 
of real brothe,-.ffeld there was subsisting contract with the Government on 
the date of nomination-Election held void. 
The appellant was elected for the Legislative Assembly or State or 
Madhya Pradesh from the Morena Constitnency. The respondent, one of 
the defeated candidates, filed an Election Petition challenging the 
E appellant's election on the ground that on the date or filing the nomination 
paper on 1.2.1990 and declaration or the result of election on 28.2.1990, the 
appellant was having subsisting contracts with the Madhya Pradesh 
Government and therefore he was disqualified under Section 9-A of the 
Repmentation of the People Act, 1951. 
F 
The appellant admitted his contract with the Public Works Depart-
I
~
ment or the Government or Madhya Pradesh as well as with the M.P. 
Audyoglk Kendra Vlkas Nlgam (Gwalior) Ltd. (MPAKVN) but submitted 
that no contract with the Apropriate Govemmeut was subsisting on the 
date or filing the nomination papers and the date or scrutiny. His case was 
G 
that he carried on his construction business in his individual capacity 
upto 31.3.1988 and from 1.4.1988 by a partnership firm named as M/s 
Sewaram Gupta and the aforesaid contracts also were carried on by the 
said partnership. Since he intended to contest the elections, he retired 
from the partnership by duly' executing a deed or dissolution on 31.12.1989 
and accordingly gave up his interest In the contract. On the same day, a 
H fresh partnership was entered into between the remaining partners and 
512 
SEWARAM v. SOBARAN 
513 
one 'P' to continue the aforesaid contracts. The appellant also stated that A 
by bis letter dated 30.1.1990 addressed to Executive Engineer P.W.D. he 
informed that he has completely severed his connection with the contracts. 
Rejecting the appellant's case, the High Court declared his election 
void declaring him disqualified under Section 9·A holding that the aban· 
donment of the contracts by appellant was not established and even after B 
his letter dated 30.1.1990 he continued to be associated with the contracts; 
that M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam was "Appropriate Government' 
under Section 9-A of the Act. 
In appeal to this Court on the question whether the contract taken C 
by the appellant with the P.W.D. of the Madhya Pradesh Government was 
subsisting on the date of filing nominations, it was contended on behalf of 
the appellant that (1) after the appellant's letter dated 30.1.1990 intimal· 
Ing the Department the he bad withdrawn from the contract no contract 
subsisted between him and the State Government; therefore there was no 
question of any disqualification under Section 9-A or the Act; (2) after the D 
appellant's letter there was no evidence to show that he participated in 
completing the contract. 
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that (1) the P.W.D. 
awarded the contract to the appellant in bis individual capacity and not E 
to any Orm. Clause 25 of the contract, which prohibited transfer or 
assignment of contract except with the prior written approval of the 
competent authority, was not complied with; (2) the sequence of events 
and documents makes it clear beyond doubt that it was the appellant 
alone who was participating in the execution or contract mudt after the 
filing of the nomination paper inasmuch as not only he participated in the F 
process of adjudiction of extension of time but also continued to sign all 
bills and Measurement Books in respect of the contract in his own name; 
and (3) the appellant's stand or severing his connection with contract by 
the letter dated 30.1,1990 was untenable because the said letter though 
addressed to Executive Engineer was not delivered In bis omce but was G 
delivered In the Omce or Sub· Divisional omcer. 
Dlsmlssln11 the appeal, this Court, 
HELD1 1. The question of subelstence of a contract with the Ap• 
proprlate Government makln11 It o dlsquollnco

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