SEWARAM AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF U.P.

Citation: [2007] 13 S.C.R. 165 · Decided: 11-12-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

I 
~-
I 
SEWARAMANDANOTHER 
A 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. 
DECEMBER 11, 2007 
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 read with s. 34 - Conviction under 
-Accused beating deceased to death with la/this and Kant his due 
to enmity - Conviction by courts below - Correctness of - Held : 
Jn view of the facts of the case and the legal principles, conviction c 
of accused by courts below upheld. 
s.34-Applicability of- Nature and scope of-Discussed. 
According to the prosecution case, on account of enmity of 
litigation between the parties, accused persons murdered 'GD'. D 
On the fateful day, three accused armed with lathis and one 
' 
accused armed with Kanthi beat 'GD'. The complainant and 'JN' 
who were with 'GD' cried for help. Accused 'RP' and 'SR' beat 
complainant with Lathis. 'GD' succumbed to her injuries. FIR 
was lodged. The investigations were carried out. Accused were E 
charged under section 302 read with section 34 and section 323 
read with section 34 IPC. The trial court relying on testimony of 
complainant and 'JN', convicted and sentenced the accused under 
section 302 read with section 34 IPC. Appellant 'SR' and 'RP' 
were also convicted under section 323 read with section 34 IPC. 
However, during pendency accused 'RP' died, and thus his appeal F 
abated. The High Court upheld the order. Hence the present 
appeal. 
Appellant-accused persons contended that even if 
prosecution version is accepted in totality, offence under section G 
302 is not made out, much less by application of section 34 IPC. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle 
165 
H 
166 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2007)13 (Addi.) S.C.R. 
A of joint liability in the doing, of a criminal act. The section is only 
a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The 
distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in 
action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by 
another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several 
B persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in 
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in 
committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom 
available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from 
the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case 
C and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge 
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting 
of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for 
which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-
D arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be 
before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section 
is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the 
position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it 
individually by himself. [170-G-H; 171-A-C) 
E 
F 
1.2. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons 
charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same 
or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but 
must have been actuated by one and the same common intention 
in order to attract the provision. (Para 12) [171-D] 
1.3. The section does not say 'the common intentions of all', 
nor does it say "an intention common to all" Under the provisions 
of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the 
existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to 
G the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a 
result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, 
when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 
34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which 
caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was 
H done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in 
I 
,l_ 
( 
\ 
' 
SEWARAMANDANOTHER v. STATEOFU.P. 
167 
[PASAYAT, J.] 
_. 
which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of individual A 
members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention 
of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. 
(Para 13) (171-E-F] 
1.4. Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused B 
by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not 
necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. 
(

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.