SETH JAGJIVAN MAVJI VITHLANI versus MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI.

Citation: [1955] 1 S.C.R. 503 · Decided: 28-05-1954 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

-
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
503 
of these letters an<l so was aware of the fact that orders 
had 
been issued. 
As a matter of fact, we have ' seen 
the originals of the High Court's office files and find 
that the names 
of the three members of the Tribunal 
are in the Chief Justice's handwriting with his 
initials 
underneath. That is an additional record of the making 
of the order. 
We hold that an order recorded in the 
manner set out above is sufficient for the purposes of 
sections 10(2) 
and 11(2) of the Bar Councils Act and 
hold that the Tribunal was validly appointed. 
Mr. G's next point is that there was no "complaint" 
to the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction to refer 
the matter to the Tribunal. This ignores the fact that 
the High Court can refer a matter of this kind "of its 
~.. 
own motion" under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils 
Act. 
We have dealt with the merits in the connected case. 
This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make 
no order about costs. 
Petition dismissed. 
SETH JAGJIVAN MA VJI VITHLANI 
ti. 
MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI. 
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. Di1.s, V1v1AN BosE, 
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.] 
Negotiable 
Instruments 
Act, 1881 (XXV/ of 1881) ss. 7, 32, 
61, 64, 78-Drawu, liability of-Acceptance-Bill payable at sight 
'> 
-Prese1ltment-Acceptance-Oral-W hether valid. 
Under section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the 
liability of the drawee arises only when he accepts the bill. There 
is no provision in the Act that the drawee is as such liable on the 
instrument, the only exception being under section 31 in the case 
of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the customer in 
his lands ; an<l even then, the liability is only 
towards the drawer 
im<l not the payee. 
There is 
no substance in the contention that section 61 of 
0e :'-ct provides for presentmen~ 
for acceptance only when the 
bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand. 
In a bill 
payable 
after 
sight, there 
are 
two distinct stages, 
·~.54 
Mr. 'G', a Senior 
Advocate of tic< 
Supreme Court. 
v. 
The Hon'ble Chief 
Justice and Judges 
of the Higle Court 
of Judicature al 
Bombay. 
Bose J. 
1954 
May 2&. 
1954 
Seth Jag;ivan 
Afaiji Fithlani 
v. 
Jvlessrs. Ra11chhod-
rlas Meghji 
504 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1955J 
1-irstly \.vhen it is 
presented 
for acceptance, 
and later when it is 
presented 
tor 
payi,ncnt. 
Section 
61 
deals 
'v1th 
the 
former, 
and section 64 'vith the latter. 
Presentment for 
acceptance 
must 
ahvays and in every case precede presentment 
for payment. 
But 
\vhen 
the 
bill 
is payable on demand both the stages synchroni.se 
and there is only one presentment, which is 
both for 
acceptance 
und for pay1ncnt and therefore the person who is entitled to recci\ c 
the payment under section 78 of the Act 
is 
the 
person who is 
entitled to present it for acceptance. 
Section 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 
1881, follo\ving 
the 
English 
L::nv, provides that the drawee 
becomes an acceptor 
\vhen he has signed his assent on the bill. 
J\ccordingly 
there c3n~ 
not be, apart from any mercantile 
usage, an oral acceptance of the 
hundi, much 
less an acceptance 
by 
conduct, 
where at 
least JJO 
question of cstoppel arises. 
What is requisite 
for fixing the drawees 
with liability under 
section 32 is the acceptance by them of the instrun1Cnt and not an 
ackno\vlcdg1nent of liability. 
As the law prescribes no 
particular 
form for acceptance, there should 
be no difficulty in construing an 
acknowledgment as 
an acceptance ; but then, it must satisfy the 
requirements of section 7, and inust appear on the bill and be 
signed by the dra\vee. 
Seth Khandas Narandas v. Dahibai (I.'-..R. 3 Born. 182), Ram 
Ravji /anibhekar v. Prahladdas Subhakaran (I.I.. •. R. 20 Born. 133), 
Bank of England v. Archer ((1843) 11 M. & W. 383) :ind Harvey, .. 
Martin ((1808) I Camp. 425) referred to. 
CIVIL 
APPELLATE 
JuRISDICTION : Civil 
Appeal 
No. 31 of 1954. 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and 
Decree dated the 9th September, 
1952, of the High 
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 811 of 
1951 from the Original Decree arising from the Judge-
ment and Decree dated 
the 
24th July, 
1951, 
of the 
Bombay City 
Civil Court at Bombay in Suit No. 2310 
of 1950. 
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for 
India (f. B. 
Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the 
appellant. 
S. 
C. Isaacs 
(S. S. Shukla, w

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.