SETH GULAB CHAND versus SETH KUDILAL AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1959] 1 S.C.R. 313 · Decided: 28-03-1958 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
SETH GULAB CHAND 
v. 
SETH KUDILAL AND ANOTHER 
313 
(S. R DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS, 
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.) 
Statute, 
Construction 
of-Retrospective operation-Rule of 
presumption-Applicability-Duty of Court-Reference to pre-exist-
ing law, if and when permissible-Right of appeal-United State of 
Gwalior, Indore and Malw~(Madhya-Bharat) High Court of Judi-
cature Act, VIII of r949, ss. 2(b), 25. 
The rule that a statute is not to have retrospective operation 
can apply only where it is doubtful from the language used 
whether or not it was intended to have such operation. 
Where 
the language of the statute plainly gives it a retrospective opera-
tion, there can be no scope for applying the rule of presumption 
against retrospective operation. The rule does not require that 
the Ceurts should be obdurate in refusing to give a statute retro-
spective operation, equally it does not justify the reading of more 
words than there are into the statute in order that the rule may 
apply. 
Delhi Cloth and General i'v!ills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Com-
missioner, Delhi, (1927) L. R. 54 I.A. 421, Smith v. Calland&r, 
(1901) A.C. 297 and Reid v. Reid, L.R. (1886) 31 Ch. D. 402, con-
sidered. 
The appellant brought a suit for specific performance of ;m 
agreement of sale in the High Court of Indore at a time whea 
Indore was a Princely State in British India. On April 22, 1948, 
the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States entered 
into a Covenant to form the United State of Gwalior, Indore and 
Malwa (Madhya-Bharat). The suit was heard by a single Judge 
and decreed on June II, 1948. 
The Ruler of Indore on June 16, 
1948, made over the administration of his State to the Raj 
Pramukh of the Ul!ited State in terms of the Covenant. By an 
ordinance promulgated by the Raj Pramukh a High Court 1':as 
established for the United State\ and the High Court of Indore 
ceased to function from July 29, 1948. The respondents preferre~ 
an appeal to the Divisional Bench of the High Court of the 
United Stah: on August 24, 1948, and the appellant preferred a 
cross appeal under the provisions of that Grdina.nee. 
The Divi-
sional Bench found in favour of the respondents in both the 
appeal and cross-appeal and dismissed the appellant's suit by a 
judgment dated Decembei; 2, 1948. The Interim Legislative 
Assembly of the United State enacted the United State of 
GwaliQr, Indore and Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) High Court of Judi-
cature Act, VIII of 1949, which came into force on January 181 
1949, and repealed the Ordinance. 
· 
40 
• 
March 28. 
• 
314 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1959] 
r958 
By s. 2(b) of the Act it was provided : 
This Act shall apply to all Criminal and Civil Proceedings 
Seti~ Guiab Chand including those under testamentary, 
intestate, matrimonial, 
v. 
· 
divorce and insolvency jurisdiction, pending in the Courts in any 
Seth Huditat 
State on the date on which the State is included in the United 
&- Another 
State and to such proceedings, arising in the said States, after 
those dates. 
By s. 25 it was provided : 
Special appeal shall lie to the Full Bench of the High Com•t 
from:-
(1) a decree or an appealable e>rder passed by the Divi-
sional Bench of two Judges of the High Court in the exercise of 
extraordinary or appellate civil jurisdiction. 
·································································· 
The appellant preferred an appeal to the Full Bench of the 
High Court under s. 25 against the judgment of the Divisional 
Bench. The Full Bench dismissed the appeal as incompetent 
holding thats. 25 could not be given retrospective operation so as 
to disturb the right that had vested in the re,pondents as to the 
finality of the judgment of the Divisional Bench which was passed 
before the Act came into force: 
Held, thats. 25 of the Act, although not in terms retrospec-
tive, has to be read withs. 2(b) of the Act which made the Act, 
and consequently s. 25, applicable to the proceedings mentioned 
in it and since the appeal before the Divisional Bench, filed after 
the inclusion of the State of Indore in the United State, was 
beyond doubt one of such proceedings, the competency of the 
appeal could not be questioned. 
Although there can be no hard and fast rule that in no case 
should the pre-existing law be referred to for the purpose of 
interpreting a new enactment, where, as in the present case, the 
language is simple, free from doubt and clea

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