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SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LTD. versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [1962] 3 S.C.R. 412 · Decided: 31-08-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

412 
.SUPREl.lE .COURT REPORTS 
{1962] 
SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LTD. 
v. 
UNION OF JNDIA 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. Sulll!A RAo and 
llf. H!DA¥A.'l'ULLAil ' JJ.) 
Partition of irufia-Diatrib1tion of rig/it and lialrili1i.--
Contr11ct ~ Go~·er"°r General in Council, if JOI' pv.rposPa of t' 
Paki&Jan-Te8!-0wnership, if a relerant con•iderat;on-Indian 
Independenu (Right•, l'roJl'rt.v and I.iabilitiea) Or~er 1947, 
.Art.. 8(1), 6. 
The appellant, a navigation company, claimed a sum of 
Rs. 44,449/· as freight from the Union of India for carrying 
IOgs of teak-wood from the fore.ts of Kanara to Karachi for 
the use of !he North Western Railway on the ba>is of a contract 
"'ith the Conservator of Forests, North Kanara, representing 
the North Western Railway. Soon after tjle steamship arri""d 
at Karachi, India was partitioned on Au1:ust 15, JM7, and in' 
canstquen.ce the North Western Railway was di\'idcd into 
two sections, the Pakistan .section ret•incd the original name 
and t11e Indian section \\'a~ ca11ed the Eas~ern Punjab Railway. 
The claim against the respondent, the :Union af India, was 
based on Art. 8( 1) of the Indian I ndepecdcnee (Rights, 
Property and Liabi!itie.) Order, 1947, and in ·the alternative 
on a Press Communique issued by the respondent on ~fay 
22, 1948. The re.<pondent denied the claim. The trial court 
held that since the suit contract could not be said to be one -<. 
exclusively for the purposes of Pakistan under Art. 8(l)(a) 
of the order, the respondent was liable under Art. 8( I )(b) of 
the order ; if, hov.•e-\·er, found that the Press C'Jmmunique 
afforded no ba<is for the claim. The Court of Appral while 
agreci~g in rejecting the claim on the basis of the Press 
Communique, held that the contract frll within Art. 8(l)(a) 
of the order and dismissed the suit. 
J/eld (per G•jendragadkar and 
Hidayatuallah, JJ.), 
that the viev.· taken hy the Appeal Court that the contract fell 
within Art. O(l)(a) ofthe order was co,,.ct and must he 
affirmed. 
• 
Judged by either of the two tests approved by this c'.'~rt 
in Union of India "· Chlman Lal J.oona as to the apphcab1hty 
of Art. 8(1)(a) and (b) of the order namd)', (1) whether the 
contract if it had been made on August 15, 1947, would have 
been a ;,ntraet for the Dominion of Pakistan or (2) whether if the 
Dominion of Pakistan had been in existence when the contract-
"'* 
\vas entered into, it would have been a contract for the pur-
poses of Pakistan, and looking at the substance of the contract, 
-
'11 S.C.R. 
SUPHElME COURTlREPORTS 
and not its f01m, there could be no doubt that the contract 
if> was exclusively for the purposes of Pakistan. 
The alternative tests approved by this court are wholly 
consistent with the consideration of ownership under Art. 6 
of the order and such consideration is both relevant and 
material in the application of tests. 
Union of India v. Chaman Lal Laona, (1957) S.C.R. 
1039, followed. 
-.. 
Union of India v. Chinubhai Jeshingbhai, (1952) 54 B.L.R. 
561 and Krishna Rajan Basu Ray v. /, nion of India, A.LR. 
1954 Cal. 623, approved. 
Union of India v. Lake Nath Saha; A.LR. -1952 Cal. 
l 40A., disapproved. 
Held, further, that the courts below were right in the 
view that they took of the 
Communique issued by the 
respondent, since it could not be said to embody a specific 
~ agreement between the two Dominions so as. to bring into 
operation Art. 3( 1) of the Order. 
The pleas of e8foppel ar.d noratio, involving as they do 
questions of fact, ar.d can only be raised where rdevant facts 
are pleaded. 
Per Subba Rao, J. The word 'purposes' occurring in 
Art. 8( I) of the order must be given its natural meaning 
namely, the purpose for which the contract was made and 
-" that purpose must be ascertoined from the terms of the con· 
tract itself and not from any other extraneous consideratio~, 
statutory or otherwise. 
The Order made 
an essential 
distinction between the purpose of the contract under Art. 
8( I) and any subsequent vesting of the goods ;n any of the 
Dominions under Art. 6 of the Order and the rights and 
liabilities of the respective Dominions und.er th.e contract 
must be separately dealt with. 
J 
Since the purpose of the contract in the instant case 
was to convey the goods 
to 
the North Western Rail-
way which was now in both the Dominions, the purposes of 
the contract were not exclusively for the Dominion o~ l'akistan. 
Consequently, the contract feil within Art. 8(l}(b) of the

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