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SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 647 · Decided: 09-05-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION 
A 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 
MAY 9, 1996 
[i<.. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
B 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: 
Ss. 3(d), 4(1), 5A, 6-Acquisition of land on which a work shop was 
situated for expansion of Dockyard for defence purposes-Workers' Union C 
challenging Notification under s. 4(1) and declaration published under s. 6 
as also the award claiming themselves to be 'person interested'-Held, a 
person entitled to compensation or by implication bound by award of com-
pensation or excess conzpensation is an interested person-Petitioner Union 
is not a person interested-Notice and hearing of it u/s. 5A(2) , is not D 
mandatory-Scope of inquiry u/s. 5A is whether the land sought to be 
acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land is suitable for 
the purpose or is an arable land-Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose 
is'public purpose-T7ie very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of 
the power of eminent domain by the State-So long as public purpose subsists 
exercise of power of eminent domain cannot be questioned-Publication of E 
declaration u/s. 6 is conclusive.evidence of public purpose-Claims for a"ears 
of salary of employees and for their rehabilitation are not gennane for 
disposal of this case. 
Words and Phrases: 'Eminent domain', 'person interested' and 'public 
p!irpose'-ยฃxplained. 
ยท 
F 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) 
No. 11043 of 1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.3.96 of the Bombay High G 
Court in A. No. 74/91 in W.P. No. 3305/90, 3:308/89. 
Ms. I11dira Jaisingh, Ms. Arnita Shenoy and Sanjay Parikh for the 
Petitioner. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
647 
H 
648 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
We have heard Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel for the 
petitioner. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the 'Act') was published on May 17, 1988 
acquiring land over which the workshop was situated for public purpose, 
namely for the expansion of dockyard for defence purpose. The petitioner 
B had challenged the validity of the said notification and the Jeclaration 
published under Section 6 on May 25, 1989 on diverse grounds. Sub-
sequently, the award came to be passed on January 15, 1991 and the same 
also came to be challenged by the petitioner-Union. The main controversy 
raised by the petitioner is that they are the 'persons interested' within the 
meaning of Section 3( d) of the Act and in conducting enquiry under 
C Section 5(A), the Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice under 
sub-section (2) of Section SA. Issuance of notice and hearing of it is 
mandatory and the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement 
vitiates the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. We find no 
force in the contention. 
D 
The only scope of the enquiry under Section SA is whether the land 
sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land 
is suitable for the purpose or is an arable land. Besides these questions, 
the inter se claim of the employer and the workmen of payment of wages 
and extent thereof are alien to the enquiry, sub-section (3) of Section SA 
E makes the scope beyond pale of doubt. If the interested person is entitled 
to compensation or by implication bound by award of compensation or 
excess compensation is an interested person. Therefore, the petitioners 
cannot claim to be persons interested for the purpose of an enquiry under 
Section SA. 
F 
Obvious, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisi-
tion is not for a public purpose; it is a ma/a fide acquisition and a vague 
public purpose of defence and so acquisition is not valid in law. Precedents 
have been copiously cited in the High Court in that behalf. The learned 
single Judge and the Division Bench elaborately considered them and held 
G that acquisition for defence purpose is a public purpose. Rodrigue case to 
Tamil Nadu Housi11g Board case settled the controversy holding that 
acquisition for housing development is not a vague purpose. Eitpansion of 
dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose. Publication of declara-
tior. under section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is for the 
H appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is 
SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION v. STATE 
649 
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needed for a public purpose or not and the C

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