SAYED MOHOMED BAQUIR EL-EDROOS (DEAD) BY LRS. versus STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [1982] 1 S.C.R. 882 · Decided: 01-10-1981 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.D. KOSHAL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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882 
B 
Cl 
SAYED MOHOMED BAQUIR EL-EDROOS 
(DEAD) BY LRS. 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
October I, 1981 
[A.O. KoSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA BRAD! AND 
R.B. MISRA, JJ.) 
Administrative Law-Special Tribunals-Statute gave finality to the orders-
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts-When must be excluded. 
Bombay Personal lnams Abolition Act 1952-Section 2( 1) ( e) E~planation­
Scope of. 
D 
A notice was issued to the Sajjadanashin of the appellant institution stating 
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G 
H 
that consequent on the coming into force of the Bombay Personal loams Aboli-
tion Act 1952 exemption from payment of land revenue was extinguished in res-
pect of the inam viIJage and that he should band over the village records to 
mamlatdar. 
The appellent in a suit filed in the Civil Court clain1ed that the inam was 
held by a religious institution and that, therefore, the provisions of the 1952 Act 
had no application to it. In replication the State claimed that under the provi-
sions of the 1952 Act the Slate Government alone was competent to decide the 
question whether the grant was a personal or a religious inam and that the Civil 
Court had no jurisdiction to decide it. Holding that it was a personal inam the 
Trial Court dismissed the appellant's suit. 
When the appellant's appeal was pending before the High Court the 
Gujarat Devasthan loams Abolition Act, 1969 was passed abolishing the inams 
held by religious charitable institutions as well. 
On the question of jurisdiction to decide whether an inam was personal or 
religious the High Court held that it was the State Government and not the 
Civil Court which had exclusive jurisdiction in this respect. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that 
unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred specifically or by necessary 
implication the Civil Court would have jurisdiction and that the finality contem-
plated by Explanation I to section 2 (I) (e) (which provides that if any question 
arises whether any grant is a personal ioam such question shall be referred to 
the State Government and that the decision of the State Government shall be 
final) is only for the purposes of the 1952 Act and could not stand in the way 
of the Civil Court entertaining the suit. 
• 
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S.M. BAQUJR v. GUJARAT (Misra, J.) 
883 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: 1. 
The finality of the decision of the Government as contemplated 
by Explanation I to section 2(1) (e} of the Act cannot exclude the jurisdiction 
of the Civil Court. Except for the Explanation, there is no other provision in 
the Act touching upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. [890 C~D] 
2. In Dulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968] 3 S.C.R. 662 this Court 
held that where a statute gave finality to the orders of the special tribunal the 
Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy 
to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Undi:r the provisions 
of the 1952 Act it cannot be said that an adequate remedy is available to the 
plain tiffs on reference made to the Government. [888 G-H] 
3. The second principle laid down in the above case is that where there is 
an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of 
the Act to find out the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided there-
in may be relevant. In the absence of any details in the enactment about the 
reference to be made to the Government, the procedure to be followed by the 
Government, and the opportunity to be afforded to the aggrieved party, it cannot 
be held that the expression "finality of the decision of the Government" used in 
the Explanation was meant to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. f890 F-G] 
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B 
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4. The High Court, however, erred in travelling beyond the provisions of 
the 1952 Act by referring to the provisions of the 1969 Act and coming to the 
conclusion that Explanation I to section 2(1) (e) of the 1952 Act and section 20 
of the 1969 A ct put beyond the pale of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the 
Civil Court had been taken away by the legislature to determine the questi(!n 
whether a particular inam was a personal or devasthan ina1n. 
The High Court 
E 
was not justified in invoking the provisions of the 1969 Act while deciding a case 
under the 1952 Act. [891 E-G] 
5. 
An entry in the alienation register as to whether an inam is personal or 
religious cannot be said to be so sacrosanct that it cannot be changed. Explana-
tion I to secti

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