SAUDAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC. versus N.D.M.C. AND ORS. ETC.

Citation: [1992] 2 S.C.R. 243 · Decided: 13-03-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

SAUDAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC. 
A 
v. 
N.D.M.C. AND ORS. ETC. 
MARCH 13, 1992 
[AM. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] 
B 
...,.,,. 
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 19(1)(g)-Public Street-User by 
citizen-Scope of-Street-trading-Whether a fundamental right-Right of a 
hawker-Ambit of. 
--
.... 
c 
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32, 136-Deciding the question of 
livelihood and survival of large number of families-Whether Court to adopt 
_,l 
compassionate approach-Claims of genuine squatters/hawkers-Detennina-
tion-Courl's directions to NDMC and MCD. 
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32,136, 19(1)(g)-Petitions by D 
hawkers-Pending-Their claims to be finalised--Courl's direction on listing 
of new petitions. 
The writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and tertain 
appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution filed against adverse judg-
E 
nients _of the High Court, were referred to a Constitution Bench for 
--'-
_ deciding the grievance of the pavement-traders that the Municipal 
Authorities were violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 
19(1)(g) and or 21 of the Constitution by refusing to permit them to trade 
on streets and footpaths in different localities of the city of Delhi, under 
the respective control of the NDMC and MCD. 
F 
f 
The Constitution Bench in Sodan Singh & Others v. New Delhi 
~ 
Municipal Committee & Others, [1989) 4 SCC 155 held that the right to 
carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitu-
tion on street pavements, if properly regulated, could not be denied on the G 
ground that the street pavements were meant exclusively for pedestrians 
and could not be put to· any other use; that the right of a pavement-hawker 
was subject to reasonable restrictions under clause(6) of Article 19 of the 
COllstitution and the State as trustee was entitled to impose all necessary 
'r 
limitatil>ns bn the tharacter extent of user by ~uch pavement-hawkers; that 
there could not be a fundamental right of citizen to occupy a particular H 
243 
244 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1992) 2 S.C.R. 
A 
place on the pavement where he would squat and engage in trading 
business, that a hawker could not assert a fundamental right to occupy r 
permanently specific places on any pavement, that the right to carry on 
any trade or business and the concept of life and personal liberty 
enshrined under Article 21 had no connection whatsoever and, that Article 
B 21 had no application. 
c 
After stating the law, the Constitution Bench remitted all the peti- "'f'. 
tions to the Division Bench for final disposal. After the decision rendered 
by the Constitution Bench, several other writ petitions ca1ne to be filed in 
this Court. 
NDM<:; Cases. 
This Court by its order dated 21st December, 1989 appointed a ~ 
Committee, known as the Thareja Committee. In the light of the NDMC's 
Scheme vide Resolution No.28 dated 10.11.1989 and the decision in Sodan 
D Singh the Committee examined the claims made by the squatters and 
identify street pavements in different areas where street hawking could be 
regulated without being a hindrance to other users. 
A direction was also ~ven by order of 23rd March, 1990 that pending 
E receipt of the report from the Committee h~wking would be permitted 
subject to the same being regulated in sensitive areas. 
During preliminary scrutiny, the Committee found that 'takhats' 
were given on hire by those who claimed to possess them on rentals varying 
from Rs.300 to Rs. 1,000 per day depending on the season or the 'takbat 
F 
holders' used to carry on business at the said 'takhats' through servants 
while they themselves attended to theil; business elsewhere and at certain 
places the 'takhat-holders' whose names appeared in the petitions were r 
non- existent i.e. the orders were in fictitious names. 
.J..... 
The Committee considered it imperative to undertake a strict 
G scrutiny to ensure that the benefit of the scheme percolated to the deserv-
ing and not to those who were merely exploiting the fluid situation by 
obtaining court orders on distorted and inaccurate facts. The Committee, 
therefore, invited claims in the form of a statement on oath coupled with 
original genuine docuJDents in support of it. This was done by public ~ 
H notices at the spot and through counsel in case of pending cases. In 
Ii 
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. 
245 
~ 
addition, local visits were made to verify presence of the claimant at the A 
site where he p

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