SATYA versus TEJA SINGH

Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 197 · Decided: 01-10-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SATYA 
v. 
TEJA SINGH 
October 1, 1974 
fH. R. KHANNA AND Y. V, CHANl>RAcHUD, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure (Aci 5 of 1908) s. 13 and Indian Evidence Act (I 
of 1872) s. 41-lndians m_arried in [ndia-Judgmelll of American State Court 
granting divorce to husband-When may be recognised by Indian Courts. 
Section 13(a), Civil Procedure Code, 1908, makes a .foreign judgment 
conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon except where it 
has not been pronounced by a Court of competent iurisdiction;' and s. 41, 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that a final judgment of a competent Court 
in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction is conclusive proof that the legal 
character which it confers or takes away accr.ied or ceased at the tim~ declared 
in t.hc judgment for that purpose. 
The appellant and respondent, who were Indian citizens were married In 
India in 1955. The respondent left for the U.S. in 1959 and from 1960 to 
l~o4 was living in Utah for sometime as a student and thereafter in employ· 
ment. 
Since 1965 he had been in Canada. He filed a petition for divorce in 
November 1964 in Nevada, and obtained a decree aga,inst the appellant in 
Dc,ember 1964. The appellant did not appear in the 
Nevada 
Court, 
was 
unrepresented and did not submit to its jurisdiction. 
In 1965, the appellant moved an application for maintenance under ~. 488, 
Criminal Procedure Court, 1898, and the respondent relied upon the divorce 
decree of the Nevada CQurt as a complete answer to the appellant's claim. The 
trial court held in favour of the appellant and'" the order was confirmed in 
revision. In further revision, the High Court held in favour of the respondent 
on the basis that 'at the crucial time of the commencement of the ptoceedings 
for divorce the petitioner was domiciled' in Nevada, that during marriage the 
domicil of the wife follows the domicil of the husband, that it was decided in 
Le Mcsur·in v. Le Mesurter [1895) A.C. 517 .that 'according to international 
law, the domicil for the time being of the married pair affords the only test 
of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage, and that therefore, the Nevada Olurt 
had jurisdiction to pass the decree of divorce.· 
. 
Allowing the appeal to this Court. 
HELD : The decree of divorce pasesd by the Nevada Couri tn U.S.A. could 
not .be recognised in India. [212F] 
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(I) The qUestion as regards the recognition to be accorded to the Nevada 
decree depends on the rules of Indian Private International Law. Our notions of 
a genuine divorce and of substantial justice and the distinctive principles of our 
public policy must determine the rules of our Private International Law. But 
awareness of foreign law in a parallel jurisdiction would be a useful guideline 
in determining these rules. 
[200 F-G; 211 A-BJ 
Shorn of confusing refinements, a foreign decree of divorce iS denied re.cog-
nition in American Courts if the judgment is without jurisdiction or -is pro- -
cnred by fraud or if treati~ it as valid would offend against public policy. The 
English law on the subject, prior to the passing of the Recognition of Divorces 
and Legal Separation Act, 1971, has grown out of a maz.e of domiciliary wilder. 
ness but English Courts have, by and large, adopted the same criteria as the 
American Courts for denying validity to foreign decrees of divorce. [206F; 
207 A-Bl 
(2) The Judgment of the Nevada Court was rendered in a dvii proceeding 
and therefore its validity in India must be determined on the terms of s. 13, 
198 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1975) 2 s.c.R. 
C.P.C. It is beside the point that the validity of that judgme11t is questioned 
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in a Criminal Court in India. If the Judgment falls under. any of the clauses 
(a) to (e) of s. 13, it will cea~ to b~ conclusive as to any matter thereby 
adjudicated upon. The Judgment will be open to collateral attack on 
tpe 
grounds menlloned in the five clauses ·of s. 13. 
[?.1? C-EJ 
(3) Under s. 13{e), ihe foreign Judgment is open to challenge 'wher~ it 
has been obtained by fraud.' Fraud as to the merits of the case may be ignored, 
but fraud as to the- jurisdiction of the Nevada Court is a vital consideration in 
the recognition of the de~ree passed by that Court. Though it is not permissible 
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to allege that the Cou1t is 'mistaken', it is permissible to allege that the Court 
was 'misled'. The essential distinction is between 'mistake' and 
'trickery'. 
[113 E-HJ 
The Duchess of Ki

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