SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. versus ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. & ORS.
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[2013] 3 S.C.R. 319 SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TR.LRS. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 8653 of 2012 ETC.) DECEMBER 3, 2012 [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.] Specific Performance: A B Agreement to sell - Suit by purchaser, for specific c , performance of agreement - Decreed by trial court - High Court reversed the decree - Held: Purchaser was, at all times, ready and willing to perform his part of the contract - It was the seller who defaulted in execution of sale deed -Insistence of the seller on further payments by the purchaser directly to D him and not to the Income Tax Authorities was not justified - Purchaser was not obliged to make any further payment to seller apart from payment of earnest money - Purchaser entitled to decree of specific performance - However, due to efflux of time and escalation of price of property, seller is E entitled to additional compensation ie. a price higher than what was stipulated in the agreement - Direction to execute the sale deed for the market price of the suit property as on date - Trial court directed to ascertain the market price. Suit for specific performance - Test of readiness and F willingness of plaintiff - Held: No straitjacket formula can be laid down on the basis of which the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is to be judged - It would depend on overall conduct of the plaintiff in the light of the conduct of the defendant. G Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s. 20 - Parameters for exercise of discretion under - Held : Cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof 319 H 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R. A would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case - The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after lapse of a long period, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles - The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness B and reasonableness - Efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Principle of 'Business Efficac( - Applicability of - The C test of business efficacy requires that a term can only be implied if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract to avoid such a failure of consideration that the parties cannot as reasonable businessmen have intended - If the contract makes business sense without the term, courts will not imply the same - In the instant case, invocation of the D principle by the High Court, notwithstanding the clear language of the agreement, not correct. Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 15(5) - Limitation for filing suit - The period of the absence of the defendant from India has E to be excluded while computing the limitation for filing of the suit - Thus the suit in the instant case was filed well within time. F Plaintiff No. 1 was the tenant of the defendant in respect of the suit property. They entered into an agreement dated 22.12.1970 to sell the suit property to plaintiff No.1. for Rs. 3,75,0001-. Plaintiff No.1 paid Rs. 50,000/- to the defendant as earnest money. Under clause 7 of the agreement, plaintiff No.1 was required to pay to the Income Tax Authorities such amount as would be desired by the defendant against the tax dues of the G defendant so as to facilitate the grant of the required tax clearance certificate and such money was to be deducted from the balance of the sale price at the time of the execution of the sale deed. In response to the query of plaintiff No.1 as regards Tax Clearance, the defendant H ' ' 1 I SATYA JAIN (D) THR. LRS. v. ANIS AHMED RUSHDIEJ321 (D) TR.LRS. sent a legal notice stating that he had written a letter to A the plaintiff No.1 on 9.9.1971 calling upon him to pay a sum of Rs. 1 lakh to the defendant. Plaintiff No.1 denied the receipt of letter dated 9.9.1971. He also reiterated his readiness to tender any payment as might be due under clause 7 of the agreement. Plaintiff No.1 received a notice from the defendant terminating the tenancy. The plaintiff filed the suit seeking a decree for specific performance B of the agreement dated 22.12.1970. The defendant in his written statement contended, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation; that the plaintiffs were not entitled c to a decree for specific performance as plaintiff No.1 had breached
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