SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
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A B C D E F G H 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R. SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Criminal Appeal No.860 of 2019) OCTOBER 07, 2020 [S. ABDUL NAZEER AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 β ss.2(l), 7A, 15, 16(2), 20, 64, 69 β Scheme and applicability of 2000 Act β Appellant and co-accused persons convicted by trial court in FIR dtd. 11.12.81 u/s.302 r/w s.34, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life β Confirmed by impugned judgment β SLP in respect of co-accused persons dismissed, however in case of appellant notice was issued on the plea of juvenility β Held: Supreme court at this stage can decide and determine the question of juvenility of the appellant, notwithstanding the fact that he was not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on the date of the offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult when the 2000 Act was enforced β As the appellant was less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.81, he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act β Further, in light of s.6, General Clauses Act r/w s.25 of the 2015 Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than eighteen years of age at the time of commission of the offence, a right which he acquired and has fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001β In terms of s.25 of the 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the proceedings which were pending when the 2015 Act was enforced β Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than 2 years thus far β Conviction of the appellant is upheld, but sentence of life imprisonment set aside β Matter remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate order/directions u/s.15 of the 2000 Act including the question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and compensation to be awarded to the family of deceased β Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 β Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 β s.2, 25, 111 β General Clauses Act, 1897 β s.6 β Penal Code, 1860 β s.302 r/w s.34. [2020] 12 S.C.R. 128 128 A B C D E F G H 129 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 β Applicability of vis-Γ -vis 2015 Act β Discussed β Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act of 2015. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 β s.25 β Scope and application of β Discussed β Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 In light of the conflicting views expressed by this Court on application of the 2000 Act to the pending proceedings, vide decisions in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar and Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench and decided in the case reported as Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another. Subsequent to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh, several amendments were made to the 2000 Act by the Amendment Act No. 33 of 2006. These amendments are significant, but first Section 2(l) of the 2000 Act will be referred which defines βjuvenile in conflict with lawβ In terms of clause (l) to section 2 of the 2000 Act, appellant, being less than 18 years of age, was juvenile on the date of commission of offence. Section 20 of the 2000 Act, which provides a special provision in respect of pending cases, post the amendment vide Act 33 of 2006, Section 20 is a special provision with respect to pending cases and begins with a limited non-obstante or overriding clause notwithstanding anything contained in the 2000 Act. Legislative intent clearly expressed states that all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court on the date on which the 2000 Act came into force shall continue before that court as if the 2000 Act had not been passed. Though the proceedings are to continue before the court, the section states that if the court comes to a finding that a juvenile has committed the offence, it shall record the finding but instead of passing an order of sentence, forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board (Board) which shall then pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act, as if the Board itself had conducted an inquiry and was satisfied that the juvenile had committed the offence. The proviso however states that the Board, for any adequate and special reasons
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