SATISH KUMAR JAYANTI LAL DABGAR versus STATE OF GUJARAT
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A B c [2015]2S.C.R. 751 SATISH KUMAR JAYANTI LAL DABGAR v. STATE OF GUJARAT (Criminal Appeal No. 230 of 2013) MARCH 10, 2015 [DIPAK MISRA AND A. K. SIKRI, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860- ss. 363, 366, 376 - Kidnapping of a girl below 16 years, inducing her to marriage and commission of rape - Conviction of accused ulss. 363, 366, 376 and sentenced accordingly - High Court upheld the conviction o however, reduced sentence of rigorous imprisonment of seven years for offence punishable u/s. 376 to rigorous imprisonment for four and a half years - Plea for reduction of sentence - Case of accused that every act between the parties was consensual - On appeal, held: On facts, clause E sixthly of s. 375 attracted making her consent for sexual intercourse as immaterial - Minor is incapable of thinking rationally and giving any consent - Consent of a minor is not treated as valid consent- Duty is cast on the other person in not taking advantage of the so-called consent given by a F girl below 16 years- Other partner in the sexual act is treated as criminal who has committed the offence of rape - So- called consent of the prosecutrix below 16 years of age cannot be treated as mitigating circumstance - If the consent of G minor is treated as mitigating circumstance, it would lead to disastrous consequences - Thus, accused not entitled to further reduction of sentence. H Dismissing the appeal, the Court 751 SATISH KUMAR JAYANTI LAL DABGAR v. STATE OF 752 GUJARAT HELD: 1.1 The High Court rightly upheld the A conviction recorded by the trial court, there is no reason to deviate therefrom. Only plea raised by the counsel for the appellant even before the High Court was for reduction of sentence. The extenuating and mitigating circumstances narrated by the Amicus Curiae have been B duly taken note of by the High Court as well. In fact, going by these very circ1;1mstances projected by the defence, the High Court reduced the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment imposed under Section 376 IPC C to 4% years. [Paras 12, 13] [762-E-F; 763-D-E] 1.2 It is to be borne in mind is that the prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age. On this fact, clause sixthly of Section 375 IPC would get attracted making her consent 0 for sexual intercourse as immaterial and inconsequential. The Legislature has introduced the said provision with sound rationale and there is an important objective behind such a provision. It is considered that a minor is incapable of thinking rationally E and giving any consent. For this reason, whether it is civil law or criminal law, the consent of a minor is not treated as valid. consent. Here the provision is concerning a girl child who is not only minor but less than 16 years of age. A minor girl can be easily lured into F giving consent for such an act without understanding the implications thereof. Such a consent, therefore, is treated as not an informed consent given after understanding the pros and cons as well as consequences of the intended action. Therefore, as a G necessary corollary, duty is cast on the other person in not taking advantage of the so-called consent given by a girl who is less than 16 years of age. Even when there is a consent of a girl below 16 years, the other partner in H 753 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R. A the sexual act is treated as criminal who has committed the offence of rape. The law leaves no choice to him and he cannot plead that the act was consensual. A fortiori, the so-called consent of the prosecutrix below 16 years of age cannot be treated as mitigating circumstance. B [Paras 14, 15] [763-F; 764-B-F] 1.3 Once the things are put in right perspective in the manner stated the case has to be treated where the appellant committed rape of a minor girl which is C regarded as heinous crime. Such an act of sexual assault has to be abhorred. If the consent of minor is treated as mitigating circumstance, it may lead to disastrous consequences. This view-gets strengthened when the 0 letter and spirit behind Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act is kept in mind. [Para 16] [764-F-H] 1.4 Merely because the appellant has now married hardly becomes a mitigating circumstance. Likewise, the appellant cannot plead that prosecutrix is also married E and having a child and, therefore, appellant should be leniently treated. It is not a case where the appellant has married the prosecutrix. Notwi
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