SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [2009] 3 S.C.R. 1166 · Decided: 05-03-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2009] 3 S.C.R. 1166 
A 
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
(Criminal Appeal No. 435 of 2009) 
B 
MARCH 5, 2009 
[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND ASOK KUMAR 
GANGUL Y, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Conviction under - Victim 
c set on fire by her husband - Dying declaration of victim -
Conviction, on basis thereof by courts below - Held: Justified 
- Dying declaration does not suffer from infirmity - Courts 
below examined evidence in detail to place reliance on the. 
dying declaration - Evidence Act, 1872. 
D 
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration -
Governing principles - Stated. 
The question which arose for consideration in this 
E 
appeal was whether the courts below were justified in 
convicting the appellant-husband uls. 302 IPC on basis 
of the dying declaration of the victim-wife. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
F 
HELD: 1.1. The situation in which a person is on the 
deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that 
the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in 
-
law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this 
reason that the requirements of oath and cross-
G 
examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the 
dying declaration be excluded, it will result in the 
miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally 
the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of 
the statement would leave the court without a scrap of 
H 
evidence. [Para 11] [1172-B, CJ 
1166 
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE v. STATE OF 
1167 
MAHARASHTRA 
1.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great A 
weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no 
power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential 
for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. 
This is the reason the court also insists that the dying 
declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full B 
confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has 
to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was 
not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product 
of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the 
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear c 
opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once 
the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and 
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction on the 
same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid 
~· 
down as an absolute rule of law that the dying 
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction D 
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration 
is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 12] [1172-0, E, F] 
1.3. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested 
evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the E 
~ 
court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and 
\ 
that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful 
scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from 
any effort to induce the deceased to make a false 
statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall F 
be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, 
even if there is no corroboration. [Paras 13] [117 4-E] 
2.1. In the instant case, the basis of conviction of the 
accused is the dying declaration. In the light of the G 
governing dying declaration principles, the acceptability 
of the alleged dying declaration has to be considered. As 
regard the statement of doctor, a hypothetical answer was 
given to a question regarding the effect of the patient who 
H 
1168 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 
A suffered burn of a very high percentage. The doctor 
categorically stated that the patient who gave dying 
declaration was in a position to do so. The stand taken 
before the trial court and before the High Court was 
rejected as there was no accidental burn due to fall of 
B small lantern. This plea is clearly without substance. 
[Paras 10, 11and13] [1172-A; 1174-D; 1171-G] 
2.2. When the evidence on record has been 
examined in great detail by the trial court and the High 
Court to place reliance on the dying declaration, the 
C c,onclusions cannot be in any way faulted. [Paras 13 and 
14] [1174-G] 
Paniben v. State of Gujarat 1992(2) SCC 474; Munnu 
Raja v. State of M.P. 1976 (3) SCC 104; State of UP. v. Ram 
D Sagar Yadav 1985(1) SCC 552; Ramawati Devi v. State of 
Bihar 1983(1) SCC 211; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public 
Prosecutor 1976 (3) SCC 618; Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. 
1974(4) SCC 264; Kake Singh v. State of M.P.198

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