SATHEEDEVI versus PRASANNA AND ANR.
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[2010] 6 S.C.R. 657 SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 4347 of 2010) MAY 7, 2010 [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.] Kera/a Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 - s.40 A 8 - Interpretation of - Suits for cancellation of sale deed - Computation of Court fees - Held: When there is a special C rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference to any other method - Deeming clause in substantive part of s.40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates any right, title or interest in D immovable property, the court fees is required to be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed, and not on its market value - Since s.40 contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of court fee, there is no reason why the expression 'value of E the property' used in s.40(1) should be substituted with the expression 'market value of the property'. Words and Phrases - Expression "value of the property" - Meaning of- In the context to s.40 of the Kera/a Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959. F Interpretation of statutes - Two well recognised rules of interpretation - Held: First and primary rule of construction is that intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself - The other important rule of G interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The appellant owned 9.98 acres of rubber plantation. She executed power of attorney in favour of her daughter 657 H 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R A (respondent no.1) in respect of the said property. After sometime, respondent no.1 transferred the property to her husband (respondent no.2) by a registered sale deed. The appellant filed suit for cancellation of the sale deed by respondent no.1 in favour of respondent no.2. B In the plaint, the value of the property was shown as Rs.7 lakhs and accordingly, the court fees was paid. However, the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fee on the market value of the plaint property. The High Court upheld the trial court order holding C that in terms of s.40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, the appellant was required to pay court fees on market value of the property and not on the value specified in the sale deed. o Before this Court, the appellant contended that the interpretation placed by the Courts below on s.40 of the Act was ex facie erroneous and liable to be set aside because that section does not provide for payment of court fee on the market value of the property. The E appellant contended that in terms of s.40(1 ), court fees is required to be paid on the value of the property for which the document was executed and the appellant had correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the property specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs. F Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. There are two well recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itsolf. If the G words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in H the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 659 in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when A such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of.the Act can legitimately arise. The other important rule of interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. B The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. [Para 10] [674-H; 675-A- D] C Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1958 SCR 360; Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR 366, relied on. 2.1. Section
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