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SATENDRA PRASAD JAIN AND OTHERS versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

Citation: [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 336 · Decided: 16-09-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. VERMA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SATENDRA PRASAD JAIN AND OTHERS 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS 
SEPTEMBER 16, 1993 
B 
(J.S. VERMA, S.P. BHARUCHA AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] 
c 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4, 5, JIA, 17(1) and 17(3A}-
Land--Acquisition of-Land statutorily vested in government-Whether can 
reve1t to ow11e1~Payme11t of compensation-Necessity of 
A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect 
of the land owned by the appellants was issued on 29th .July, 1986. The 
notification stated that the acquisition was for the development and con-
struction of a Mandi and that in view of the urgency of the public purposes 
Section 17 ( 4) was applied and the provisions of Section 5-A were dispensed 
D with. On 24th October, 1986 the Section 6 declaration was issued which 
applied the provisions of Section 17(1) to the land and it was stated that 
the Collector could, though no award under Section 11 had been made, on 
the expiration of fifteen days from the date of publication of the notice 
under Section 9(1), take possession of the land. On 2nd December, 1986 
E 
the Section 9(1) notice was published. 
F 
The appellants in their Writ Petition to the High Court impugned 
the acquisition proceedings but the same was dismissed by a Division 
Bench which upheld the acquisition proceedings. On 27th F'ebruary, 1987 
the possession of the land was taken by the first and seconcl respondents 
from the appellants and hancled over to the third respondent. The Special 
Leave Petition filed by the appellants in this Court was dismissed. 
On 13th January, 1989 the third respondent resolved the exclude 
from acquisition a portion of the land and the resolution stated that this 
G was because of shortage of funds and because the proposed Mandi site was 
far away. 
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court on 10th August, 
1989 for a Writ of Mandamus to the respondents to direct them to make 
and publish an award in respect of the said land. On 27th June, 1990 the 
H Special Land Acquisition Officer wrote to the third respondent recording 
336 
.. 
S.P.JAIN v. STATE 
337 
that compensation for the purpose of making an award in respect of the A 
lands had been claimed from the third respondent but that the third 
respondent had not ma.de the monies available, and that adjusting the time 
taken in the proceedings before the High Court, the period of two years 
had expired on 18th January, 1989. 
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition on 8th February, 1991 
on the ground that it was the appellants own case that more than two years 
had elapsed since the date of issue of the notification under Section 4, that, 
by reason of Section HA the entire proceedings for acquisition of the said 
land had lapsed, that by the mere fact that possession had been taken in 
pursuance of Section 17(1), the necessity of giving an award, as mandated 
by Section HA, within a period of two years from the date of publication 
of the notification under Section 4 could not be dispensed with. 
B 
c 
In the appeal to this Court, it was submitted on behalf of the 
appellant that on taking of possession of the said land under the 
provisions of Section 17(1) the land vested absolutely in the first respon-
D 
dent and the first respondent had become its owner, that Section llA had 
to be interpreted harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act and 
could not apply whether the proceedings for acquisition of the land had 
already come to an end by reason of the land having vested in the 
Government. The appeal was contested on behalf of the respondents by E 
submitting that an award could be made within such time as the court 
considered reasonable, and that the requirements of Section 17 (3A) having 
not been complied with there was no vesting of the land in the first 
respondent and that for being kept out of possession of the said land the 
payment of compensation to the appellants under Section 5 would ade-
quately recompen~e them. ยท 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
F 
HELD : 1. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the 
land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in G 
respect thereof has been made under Section 11. [343-G] 
2. When Section 17(1) is"applied by reason of urgency, Government 
takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under 
Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which 
is vested in the Government. [344-B] 
H 
338 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1

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