SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED versus NEXT RADIO LIMITED & ORS.

Citation: [2021] 9 S.C.R. 137 · Decided: 27-09-2021 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.Y. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED
v.
NEXT RADIO LIMITED & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 5985-5987 of 2021)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2021
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Constitution of India: Art. 226 – Writ jurisdiction, scope of –
Judicial rewriting, permissibility – Held: Writ court is entrusted by
the Constitution of the power of judicial review – In the discharge
of its mandate, the court  may evaluate the validity of a legislation
or rules made under it – However, the court in exercise of judicial
review cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicial
interpretation by re-writing statutory language – In the instant case,
High Court by interim order modified the operation of Rule 29 of
the  Copyright Rules by stipulating that the particulars which are to
be furnished in the notice may be furnished within a period of fifteen
days after the broadcast – According to Rule 29, the broadcasting
organisation shall give notice of fifteen days before broadcasting,
exception provides that in  unforeseen circumstances, notice shall
be given twenty four hours after the broadcasting – The interim
order converted the second proviso into a “routine procedure”
instead of an exception (as the High Court has described its
direction) that notice shall be given fifteen days after the broadcast
– This exercise by the High Court amounts to re-writing – Such an
exercise of judicial redrafting of legislation or delegated legislation
cannot be carried out – An exercise of judicial rewriting of a
statutory rule by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226
particularly in interlocutory proceedings is not warranted –
Copyright Rules, 2013 – r.29 (4) – Interlocutory order.
Judicial review: Scope of – Held: Court in exercise of judicial
review cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicial
interpretation by re-writing statutory language – Draftsmanship is
a function entrusted to the legislature – Craftsmanship on the judicial
side cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing the
words of a statute – For then, the judicial craft enters the forbidden
domain of a legislative draft.
[2021] 9 S.C.R. 137
137
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 9 S.C.R.
Interpretation of statutes: It is a settled principle of law that
when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, it is not
permissible for the court to read words into the statute.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is a settled principle of law that when the
words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, it is not permissible
for the court to read words into the statute. The court is entrusted
by the Constitution of the power of judicial review. In the
discharge of its mandate, the court  may evaluate the validity of a
legislation or rules made under it. A statute may be invalidated if
is ultra vires constitutional guarantees or transgresses the
legislative domain entrusted to the enacting legislature.
Delegated legislation can, if it results in a constitutional infraction
or is contrary to  the ambit of the enacting statute  be invalidated.
However, the court in the exercise of judicial review cannot
supplant the terms of the provision through judicial interpretation
by re-writing statutory language. Draftsmanship is a function
entrusted to the legislature. Craftsmanship on the judicial side
cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing the
words of a statute. For then, the judicial craft enters the forbidden
domain of a legislative draft. That precisely is what the Division
Bench of the High Court has done by its interim order. Section
31D(2) speaks of the necessity of giving prior notice, in the
manner as may be prescribed, of the intention to broadcast the
work stating the duration and the territorial coverage of the
broadcast, together with the payment of royalties in the manner
and at the rates fixed by the Appellate Board. While the High
Court held the broadcasters down to the requirement of prior
notice, it modified the operation of Rule 29 by stipulating that
the particulars which are to be furnished in the notice may be
furnished within a period of fifteen days after the broadcast.  The
High Court was also of the view that the second proviso may be
resorted to as a matter of routine, instead of as an exception and
that the ex post facto reporting should be enlarged to a period of
fifteen days (instead of a period of twenty four hours). Such an
exercise was impermissible since it 

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