SARDAR INDER SINGH versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 605 SARDAR INDER SINGH v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN (and connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C.J., V ENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA, S. K. DAs and GA.JENDRAC;ADKAR JJ.) C01.stit11tio11a! la/IJ-Delegated legislation and conditional legis- lation-Distinction-Statute co11fe1"1'ing power 0•1 outside authority to extend its operatio11-Validity-Rajastha11 (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, (Rajasthan Ordi11a11ce No. IX of 1949), SS. 3, 4, 7(1) 15-Notifications by R.ajpramukh-Validity-Whether Ordini!nce contravwes Aus. 14 ,;11d 19( 7)(/) of the Constitution of India. By s. 3(1) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, which was promulgated on June 21, 1949, by the Raj- pramukh of Rajasthan, it was provided : "It shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of two years unless this period is further extended by the Rajprnmukh by notifi- cation in the Rajasthan Gazette." In exercise of the power conferred by this section the Raj- pramukh issued a nctification on June 14, 1951, providing that the above Ordinance "shall remain in force for a further period of two years with effect from June 21, 1951'', and on June 20, 1953, he issued a iurther notification providing that the said Ordinance "shall r•':main in force for a term of one vear with effect from June 21, 1953'". Doubts having been raised as to the validity of the notification <lated June 20, 1953, the Raj- prarnukh issued anothe~ Ordinance 0~1 February 15, 1954, subs- tituting for s. 3 of the original Ordinance dated June 21, 1949, the: following : "It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of fiye years"'. It was contended inter alia for the petitioners that the Ordinance dated June 21, 1949, and the notifications issued by the Rajpramukh were invalid on the grounds ( l) that s. 3 of the Ordinance was ultra viru as the power which it conferred '-Oil the !bipr'1mukh to extend the period fixed therein \vas an unconstituti011:1i delcg;.Hion of legislative po\ver, (2) that. the notification dated June 20, 1953, was bad because the Legislature of Rajasthan had been constituted on March 29, 1952, and the authority of the Rajpr~mnkh to legislate conferred by Art. 385 of the Constitution of India had, on that date, conl<: to an end and (3) that the Ordinance rnntraYcned Arts. 14 and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. Held: (1) Section 3 of the Or<lina1m: in so far as it autho- rised the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Ordinance fell within the category of conditional legislation and is intra t•ires. 1957 February 8. 1957 -Sardar lnder Singh v. The State of Rqjasthan 606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19571 A provision in a statute conferring a po\ver on an outside authority to bring it into force at such tin1e as it might. in its O\VJ1 discretion, deter91ine, is conditional an<l not delegattd legis- lation and is valid, and it can make no difference in the character of a legislation as a con<litional one that the legislature, after it- self enacting the hnv and fixing, on a consi<lcration of the iacrs as they might have then existed, the period of its duration, confers a pov.·er on an outsi<le authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts \vhich called forth the lcgisbtion continues to subsist. Queen v. l!urah. (1878) 5 I.A. 178, rclie<l on. l:i re '[he /)clhi Latvs /let, 1912, ( 1Sl'51) S.C.R. 7~7 anJ State of nonihay v. 1Varotharnda.• /ethabai, (1951) S.C.R. 51, referred to. fatind1·a Nath Guptn v. 595, in so far as it decided cnact1ncnt cannot validly be dissented frotn. The State of Bihar. (1949) I'. C. R. th~tl a po"ver to e:-:tend the lilc of an coni"r.::rrc<l on an outside authority, (2) 1"hc Rajpratnukh issued the notification tLJ.tcd June 20, 1953, in his character as the autl1urity on \Vho1n po\ver \Vas con- ferred under s. 3 of the ()rdinanct and not as the legisl:Htve authority of the State and accordingly the notification is \'::ilid. ' ( 3) The Ordin:.ince cannot be held to be bad under , \rt. J 4 of the Constitution on the ground that s. I 5 of the Ordinance \vhich authorises the (;overn1ncnt to exeinpt any person or class of persons froin the operation of the OrJinancc do~s not lay do\\·n the principles on vvhich excn1ption could be granted leaving the matter to the
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex