SARASWATHY versus BABU
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A B [2013] 12 S.C.R. 914 SARASWATHY v. BABU (Criminal Appeal No. 1999 of 2013) NOVEMBER 25, 2013 [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 C - ss. 2(g) 3, 18, 19, 20 and 22 - Petition under - Order of court directing the husband to allow the wife to reside in the shared household - The order defied by the husband - Whether the act of the husband amounts to 'domestic violence' as defined under the Act - Held: The act of the husband comes squarely o within the ambit of s.3- In view of continued domestic violence by the husband against the wife, /-ligh Court made an apparent error in holding that the conduct of the parties prior to coming into force of the Act cannot be taken into consideration - The wife having been iwrassed, is entitled to E protection orders and residence orders alongwith maintenance - In addition, she is also entitled for compensation and damages for injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress caused by the acts of domestic violence by the husband - Husband directed to pay F compensation and damages to the extent of Rs.5 /akhs. Words and Phrases - 'Domestic violence' - Meaning of, in the context of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. G The appellant-wife of the respondent, filed petition seeking relief u/ss.18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court directed the respondent to give her maintenance and also gave residence order in her matrimonial house directing H 914 SARASWATHY v. BABU 915 the police to give her protection in implementing the A residence order. The respondent-husband, despite the order of the court, did not allow the appellant to reside in the shared household. 1.n the contempt petition filed by the appellant, the respondent gave wrong address and mislead the High Court. B The High Court, by impugned order held that though the offending acts of the husband could be construed as offences under other enactments, it could not be construed as acts of domestic violence under the 2005 Act, until the Act came into force. Hence the present C appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Section 2 (g) of Protection of Women from 0 Domestic Violence Act, 2005 states that "domestic violence" has the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 is the definition of domestic violence. Clause (iv) of Section 3 relates to "economic abuse" which includes prohibition or E restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household as evident from clause (c) of Section 3(iv). [Para 12] [927-C-D] 2. In the present case, in view of the fact that even after the order passed by the Subordinate Judge the respondent-husband did not allow the appellant-wife to reside in the shared household matrimonial house, there F is a continuance of domestic violence committed by the G respondent-husband against the appellant-wife. In view of such continued domestic violence, it is not necessary for the courts below to decide whether the domestic violence is committed prior to the coming into force of the Act and whether such act falls within the definition of the H 916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 12 S.C.R. A term 'Domestic Violence' as defined under Section 3 of the Act [Para 13] [927-E-F] 3. The act of the respondent-husband squarely comes within the ambit of Section 3 of the Act which 8 defines "domestic violence" in wide term. The High Court made an apparent error in holding that the conduct of the parties prior to the coming into force of the Act cannot be taken into consideration while passing an order. This is a case where the respondent-husband has not complied with the order and direction passed by the trial C court and the appellate court. He also misleads the court by giving wrong statement before the High Court in the contempt petition filed by the appellant-wife. The appellant-wife having been harassed since 2000 is entitled for protection orders and residence orders under D Section 18 and 19 of the Act along with the maintenance as allowed by the trial court under Section 20 (d) of the Act. Apart from these reliefs, she is also entitled for compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and e
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