LexSANTOSH DE AND ANOTHER versus ARCHNA GUHA AND ORS.
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- SANTOSH DE AND ANOTHER A v. ARCHNA GUHA AND ORS. FEBRUARY 3, 1994 [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.] B Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 245(3) (as inserted by West Bengal Amendment Act, 1988)-Discharge of accused in wa"ant case-Not automatic on the failure of prosecution to adduce all evidence within the prescribed period of four years-Magistrate on being satisfied on the basis of C evidence that discharge would not be in the interest of justice, can reject the discharge application-Deposition of complainant already recorded even in the absence of cross-examination can be treated as evidence-Nature of of- fence relevant factor to be taken into account by Magistrate. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 21, 136 and 226-Speedy trial-In- D ordinate delay in proceeding with the trial-Quashing of entire proceedings improper since truth of the allegations could be arrived at only after proper trial-Interference with criminal proceedings-Called for only in cases of grave illegality-Provisions for interference-Any and every i"egularity or infraction cannot constitute ground for interference at interlocutory stages-Such inter- E ference tends to defeat the ends of justice-Not to be allowed to be misused by those who could afford to approach the superior courts. Respondent filed a private complaint in August, 1977 against five police officers alleging that they had tortured her at the police head- quarters in July, 1974. Summons were issued and the accused surrendered. F In December 1978, the Magistrate committed the accused to stand trial before the Sessions Court for offences under Sections 325, 330, 331 and 509 read with Section 34 I.P.C. Accused filed a criminal revision against the order of commital and the High Court allowed the same and directed the Magistrate to try the case as a Warrant case. Thereafter the matter G could not proceed beyond the examination-in-chief of the complainant on account of the various proceedings taken by the accused in superior Courts against interlocutory order. The present appeals were filed by two of the five accused, the other three having passed away. The first of the two aJ>peals arose out of claim H 549 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R. A of the accused for a. discharge under Section 245(3) Criminal Procedure Code (as inserted by the State Government). The plea was rejected by the Magistrate and the Criminal revision against the same was dismissed by the High Court. According to Section 245(3) Criminal Procedure Code if all the evidence is not produced in support of the prosecution within four B years from the date of appearance of the accused, the Megistrate shall have to discharge the accused unless he is satisfied that it will not be the interest of justice to do so. The other appeal is directed against the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court reversing the Judgment of a Single Judge, who had C allowed the Writ Petition tiled by the accused and held that there was inordinate delay in proceeding with the trial which violated the accused's right to speedy trial. Dismissing both the appeals, this Court D HELD: 1.1. Discharge of the accused under sub-section (3) of Section E 245 Criminal Procedure Code is not automatic once it is found that the prosecution has failed to adduce and the evidence referred to in Section 244 Cr.P.C. within four years of the appearance of the accused. If the Magistrate is satisfied that it will not be in the interest of justice to do so, he will not discharge the accused. But the said satisfaction has to be formed on the basis of evidence already recorded and for special reasons which, of course, he shall have to record in his order. (554-C, D] 1.2. In the instant case, the accused appeared in the Court for the first time on November 5, 1977. All the evidence on behalf of the com- p plainant-prosecution has admittedly not been adduced within four years therefrom. Though sub-section (3) was not on the statute book in the year 1981 or 1982, as it was inserted only in the year 1988, the court may assume · for the purpose of the instant case that the four years period prescribed by Section 245(3) must be deemed to have expired on the date the sub-sec- G lion was inserted. The Magistrate has exercised his discretion and judg- ment properly in the facts of the case by dismissing the application tiled by the accused under Section 245(3) Cr.P.C. The High Court,
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