SANTOKH SINGH versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Citation: [1973] 3 S.C.R. 533 · Decided: 20-02-1973 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
J) 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SANTOKH SINGH 
v. 
DELHI ADMINISTRATION 
February 20, 1973 
533 
[A. ALAGIRISWAMJ, I. D. DUA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J 
Constitutwn of India, Article l9(l)(a)-Punjab Security of State 
Act (No. 12 of 1953)-Sec. 9 whether 
violates 
Article 19(1)(a)-
Speech or statement which "tends to over throw the 
State"-whether 
restriction unreasonable-Constitution of India, 
Art. 136-Appeal 
by 
Speciui leave on a pure queStion of law effecting constitutional validity of 
an Act-lvhether can be raised for first time in Supreme Court-Scope 
of appeal lln special [eave-whether apper/ant can 
claini 
adjudicction 
on n1crits as of right. 
The appellant was prosecuted under section 9 of the Maintenance 
of 
Punjab 
Security 
of 
State 
Act 
for 
addressing 
a 
pub-
lic meeting in which it was alleged that he 
had incited 
th• defence 
employees to commit offences prejud'icial to security of the State or to 
the maintenance of public order. Sec. 9 of the Act prohibits speeches 
or staten1ents etc, which have effect of undermining the security 
of 
the State, friendly .relations with foreign States, public order 
decency 
or morality or which am,oun·t to contempt of court, 
defamation 
or 
incitenlent to an offence prejudicial to the security of th~ State or the 
maintenance of public order or Wlhich tends to over throw 
the · State._ 
On perusal of the documents filed u/s. 173 of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrale 
came to the conclusion that the prima facie case was established. 
The 
appellant 
un~uccessfuJiy challenged the said 1nter-locutory order before 
the Sessions Court and then in th~ High Court. 
On appeal by special 
leave, the appellant raised the questio.o of constitutional 
validity 
of 
Sec. 9 of the ,\ct. The appellant contended: (i) that Sec. 9 
of the 
Punjab Security of State Act waSI violative of the fundamental 
right 
guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, and (ii) in the 
altern11tive, thE ope'ration of Sec. I) should be limited 
only 
to 
suc}1 
matters as involve incitement to violence or intention or 
tendency to 
create 
publi~ disorder or cause disturbance tc> public peace. 
Jn di!'-
missing the appeal. 
HELD : (i) Except the words "tends to o\·er throw the State" 
the 
rest of the provisions of Section 9 rep<oduce the provisions of Art. 19(2) 
of the Constitution. The prohibition relating 
to 
offending 
speech, 
wod!s or the . other publications wbic!) tend to over throw the 
State 
clearly fall within the sweep of the expression "incitemeiit to an offence 
prejudicial to the security of the 
State". Restriction, 
therefore, 
is 
prima facie reasonable restriction. 
rs37 C-El 
. Superintendent of Central Jail, Fatehgarh v. Ram· Manohar 
Lohia 
11962] 2 S.C.R. 321, distinguished on facts. 
(ii) Reasonable restrictions in respect of matters specified in Art. 
1?(2). are essential for integrated development on egalitarian. progres-
OJve lines of any peace lovin~ civilised society. Art. 19(2) thus save• 
the constitutional validity of Sec. 9 of the Act. The analogy between 
s: 124( I) !PC and Sec. 9 of the Act is wholly misoonceived 
and 
in 
vrew of ~he comprehensive sweep of Art. 19(2). Sec. 9 of the Act cannot 
be . re~tncted to those speeches and expressions which ·ir.cite or tend 
to mc1te viclence only. 
Sec. 9 cannot be interpreted in 
a 
restricted 
2-·L 761 SuPCl/73 
. 
534 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1973] 3 S.C.R. 
manner Sec'. 124( 1) IPC was interpreted in Kedarnath Singh v. State of 
A 
Bihar r.1966 Supp, 2 S.C.R. 7691. [539 A-Cl 
(iii) 'fhc Supreme Court may allow the question of law elf~ 
the constitutional validity of an Act for the first ti~ to 
be 
k"aised 
in Supreme Court. 
In an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of 
the Constitution, the scope of the '-.ippeal is not enlarged after leave and 
the appellant cannot as of right claim adjudicaticm 
on 
merits. 
The 
B 
Court would not pronounce its opinion on the merits of 
the 
charge 
framed against the appellant. 
[540 C-E] 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
197 of 1972. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
24th day of February 1972, of the Delhi High Court in Cr. Rev. 
c 
No. 469 of 1970. 
S. C. Agarwala and A. K. Gupta for the appellant. 
D. P. Bhandari and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DuA, J. 
This appeal by special leave is directed against the 
judgment and order of a learned single Judge of the High 

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