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SANJAY KUMAR JAIN versus STATE OF DELHI

Citation: [2010] 14 S.C.R. 1135 · Decided: 16-12-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DALVEER BHANDARI · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1135 
Β·sANJAY KUMAR JAIN 
v. 
STATE OF DELHI 
(Criminal Appeal No. 2400 of 2010) 
DECEMBER 16, 2010 
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 3048 and 302 - Murder and 
dowry death - Death of married woman within fourteen months 
A 
B 
of marriage - Ante mortem bodily injuries on her body -
C 
Husband charged ulss. 302 and 3048 - Held: There was no 
consistency in the prosecution version with regard offence u/ 
s. 302 thus, accused cannot be convicted u/s. 302 - The 
parents of the deceased however testified that deceased was 
subjected to consistent cruelty and harassment by her D 
husband in connection with demand for dowry soon before her 
death -
Ingredients of s. 3048 having been satisfied, 
husband convicted u/s. 3048 and sentenced to 9 years 
rigorous imprisonment with fine - Dowry death - Evidence Act, 
1872 - s. 1138 - Crime against women. 
E 
The appellant's wife died within the fourteen months 
of marriage. The prosecution alleged that the deceased 
was being subjected to consistent cruelty and 
harassment by the appellant for not bringing sufficient 
dowry which continued till her death. The post-mortem 
report revealed that the deceased bore ten ante-mortem 
injuries on her body. PW20, who conducted the post-
mortem, opined that the death was caused due to 
asphyxia following strangulation by rope like material and 
F 
the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary 
G 
course of nature. The appellant was charged u/ss. 302 
and 3048 IPC. On basis of the post mortem report and 
the evidence of the parents of the deceased, the trial 
court convicted the appellant u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced 
1135 
H 
' 
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 
A him to life imprisonment. While convicting the appellant, 
the trial court did not discuss the alternative charge under 
section 304 IPC. The conviction u/s. 302 IPC was upheld 
by the High Court. The High Court also did not deal with 
the charge under section 3048 IPC. Therefore, the 
B appellant filed the instant appeal. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 In a case of circumstantial evidence, all 
circumstances must lead to the conclusion that the 
C appellant-accused was the only one who had committed 
the crime and none else. [Para 38] [1154-F-G] 
1.2 There is no consistency in the prosecution 
version on the aspect that the door leading to the house 
0 
of the deceased had free access and possibility of any 
other person entering the house of the deceased cannot 
be ruled out; that the landlord had clear access to the 
house of the deceased and non-examination of the 
landlord created serious doubt in the prosecution 
E version; that the injuries found on the body of the 
appellant-accused remained unexplained and no 
question was put to the accused to explain the alleged 
injuries on the person; that there was a material 
contradiction as to the ornaments which the deceased 
was wearing and were missing from her body; that the 
F string and wicket (stump) were not seized by the 
Investigating Officer on the same day as they were lying 
near the dead body; that the string and the wicket (stump) 
were not sent to Central Forensic Science Laboratory 
(CFSL) despite the opinion of the doctor telling the 
G circumstances in favour of the accused for being used 
in the alleged crime; and that the string allegedly used 
for strangulating the deceased was 8 % inches in length 
and making it impossible to commit the offence in the 
manner alleged by the prosecution. [Para 39] [1154-G-H; 
H 1155-A-F] 
SANJAY KUMAR JAIN v. STATE OF DELHI 
1137 
1.3 In view of the infirmities in thu prosecution's 
A 
version, the conviction under Section 302 IPC cannot be 
sustained. The impugned judgment of the High Court and 
the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge are set 
aside and the appellant is acquitted as far as his 
conviction under Section 302 IPC is concerned. [Para 40] 
B 
[1155-G-H] 
C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 
(1996) 10 SCC 193; G. Parshwanath v. State of Kamataka 
(2010) 8 SCC 593; Varun Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan 
C 
JT 2010 (11) SC 419; Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra 
2007 (12) sec 341 - referred to. 
2.1 In the instant case, though the appellant was also 
charged under Section 3048, but in view of his 
conviction under Section 302 IPC, the trial court did not D 
proceed with the charge under Section 3048 IPC. [Para 
41] [1156-A-8] 
2.2 The mar

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