SANGEETA SINGH versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 823 · Decided: 23-08-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

SANGEETA SINGH 
A 
V. 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
AUGUST 23, 2005 
B 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.] 
Interpretation of Statutes-Casus Ornissus-Eligibility criteria enumer-
ating prohibited categories of relationships for obtaining petroleum product 
dealership-Certain relationships specifically not mentioned-Writ petitions 
filed before High Court allowed holding that a literal or narrow meaning C 
should not be adopted in such cases and disqualification is permissible even 
if a relationship does not figure within the prohibited categories-On appeal 
Held, Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provisions or a stipulated 
condition which is plain and unambiguous-Defective phrasing of an Act 
cannot be added to or mended so to make up the deficiencies-Rules of D 
interpretation do not permit so, unless the provisions as it stands is 
meaningless or of doubtful meaning-A casus omissus cannot be supplied 
by a court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it 
is found in the four corners offhe salute ilse/f-Casus omissus should not 
be readily inferred and for that purpose parts of the statute should be 
construed together so that the construction is consistent with the whole 
statute-Where casus omissus occurs either due to inadvertence of the 
legislatured or on the principle, quad semel out bis existit proete,-eunt 
legislators, then the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be 
disposed of according to the previous law-Matter remitted to High Court 
E 
for considering other issues raised. 
F 
The appellants were selected as eligible petroleum product dealers. 
Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court to challenge their 
eligibility, against the judgment of which, the present five appeals were 
filed. The issue involved was whether the appellants could be held 
ineligible because their close relatives had a petroleum product dealer-
ship. In two of these appeals, the selected person's father-in-law held a 
dealership and the remaining appeals were similarly placed. Although, 
none of tile relationships in question came within the prohibited catego-
G 
ries. High Court allowed the writ petitions holding that a literal or 
narrow meaning should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a H 
823 
824 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
dealership, the daughter-in-law is disqualified, notwithstanding the fact 
that such a relationship does not figure within the prohibited categories 
as per the eligibility criteria on the advertisements. Appellants being 
aggrieved by the judgments filed these appeals. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Appellants contended that view of the High Court was clearly 
untenable as the advertisement indicated the covered persons in clear 
and unambiguous terms; and that it was not permissible for the High 
Court to add persons to the list of relatives. 
Respondents contended that intentions have to be seen as monopoly 
has to be discouraged and while dealing with State or public sector 
undertakings largesse a narrow meaning should not be given; and that 
it is a clear case of casus omisus, an unintentional omission, which is to 
be ignored as the intention is clear. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provision 
or a stipulated condition, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is 
an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the 
determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar is the position for 
conditions stipulated in advertisements. [828-H; 829-A] 
I 
1.2. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental refer-
ences to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the · 
intention of the Legislature e~acting it. The intention of the Legislature 
is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that 
F attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not 
been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its 
support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection 
of words as meaningless has to be avoided. Courts, cannot ·aid. the 
Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, and cannot add or mend, and 
by construction mak~ up deficiencies, which are left there. It is contrary 
G to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is abso-
lutely necessary to do so, Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts 
to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless o

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