SANGAM SPINNERS versus REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER-I
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SANGAM SPINNERS A v. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER-I DECEMBER 4, 2007 [DR. ARIJIT P ASAY AT AND P. SATHASIV AM, JJ.] B Employees Provident Funds Act, l 952-s. l 6(1)(d)-Infancy protection-To newly set up factories, by way of exemption from applicability of the Act for 3 years-Omission of exemption provision C in 1998 w.r.e.f 22-9-1997-Held: Irrespective of the omission, appellant factory, which was set up on 1-9-1995, entitled to protection for full 3 years startingfrom the date of set up-General Clauses Act 1897-s.6 (c). Repeal-Effect of, on accrued right-General Clauses Act 1897- D s.6 (c). Interpretation of Statutes-Retrospective or prospective operation-Determination-Held: Every statute is prima facie prospective unless expressly or by necessary implication made to have E retrospective operation. Appellant factory was set up on 1-9-1995. Newly set up factories were entitled to infancy protection i.e. exemption from applicability of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, for 3 years from the date of set up. The provision for such infancy protection i.e. clause F (d) of s.16(1) of the Act was omitted from the statute in 1998, but with retrospective effect, from 22-9-1997. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner held that in view of the omission of s.16(1 )( d) of the Act with retrospective effect, the G benefit of exemption thereunder was available to appellant-factory only till 22-9-1997 and not thereafter. That order was affirmed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. 883 H 884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R. A Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I.I.In terms ofClause(c)ofs.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred B under the enactment repealed. The effect of the amendment in the instant case is the same. [Para 16) [891-CJ 1.2. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in C general is not applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova constitutio futuris formam imponere D debet non praeteritis'. As a logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation E than its language renders necessary. In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for determining the scope of the retrospectivity intended by Parliament. [Para 17) [891-D, E, G; 892-AJ ) Keshvan Madhavan Memon v. State of Bombay, AIR (1951) SC >- F 128; Delhi Cloth Mills & General Co. Ltd v. CIT. Delhi AIR (1927) PC 242; Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi Sitharamamma, AIR (1965) SC 1970; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR (1989) SC (1933); State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 19; Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. C.R. G Rangadhamaiah & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 623 and S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd v. Union of India and Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 740, relied on. Jayantilal Amratlal v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1971) SC 1193; Govinddas and Ors. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr., AIR (1977) H SANG AM SPINNERS v. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND 885 COMMISSIONER-I [PASA YAT,J.] SC 552 and Magic Wash Industries (P) Ltd v. Assistant Provident Fund A Commissioner, Panaji andAnr., (1999) Lab.I.C. 2197, referred to. Reid v. Reid, (1886) 31 Ch D 402, referred to. "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by Justice G.P. Singh. -1 (Tenth Edition, 2006), referred to. B 2. The appellant shall be entitled to the protection for the period of three years starting from the date the establishment was set up irrespective of the repeal of the provision for such infancy protection. [Para 20) [892-E] C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1785 of 2001. From the Judgment and final Order dated 29.11.2000 of the High Court ofRaj
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