LexSANDHYA RANI SARKAR versus SUDHA RANI DEBI AND ORS.
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T
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839
SANDHYA RANI SARKAR
v.
SUDHA RANI DEBI AND ORS.
February 14, 1978
[M. H. BEG, C. J. AND D. A.,DESAI, J.J
Comtitution of India, 1950, Article 136-lnterference by Supreme Court,
when condonation of delay was ordered by the Court, exercising its db.ere·
tionary powers and H•hen sufficient cause has been shown, propriety-Limifa,.
tion Act (36 of 1963 ), 1963, S. 5.
A
B
Civil Procedure Code, (Act 5 of 1908), Section
2(2)--Decree-Pre/ilni·
nary decree-Decree passed in a suit for specific performance of- contract of
sale of immovable property callin!? upon the purchaser to deposit the balance
C
of consideration within the time stipulated in decree' with superadded condf ..
tion that in the event of default, the suit would be dismissed is not aj preli·
1ninary decree.
Limitation Act (36 of 1963 ), Section 5-Condonation of delay-Amend·
ment of decree-Decree in a suit for specific performance of contract for the
sale of immovable property calling upon the. purchaser to deposit balance of
consideration within the time stipulated in decree-Order ,extending time to
deposit the balance of consideration would not result in amending the decree.
Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), •Section 16(b) and {c)-Specific perform-
ance of contract-Decree for specific performance! refused.
A contract for Sale of premises No. 88·A Rash 1Behari Avenue, Calcutta
was entered into between the appellant and deceased Smt. Paribala Das on
8·2·1956 for a consideration of Rs. 46,000/·. The agreement for sale Ex.I,
recites that Rs. 1001/. were paid as earnesti money and subsequently
the
defendant vendor received a further sum of Rs. 2000/. J'rom the plaintiff
intending purchaser. Parties had agreed to complete the transaction by the
end of April '56.
The appellant was put in actuGJ possessi.on of the 1st and
2nd floors of the premises by the defendant vendor in her anxiety to complete
her Part of the cO!ltract, but the appellant was seeking time on so1ne pretext
or the other and ultin1ately filed a suit for specific performance on 28th
January 1957, alleging non·performance by the vendor defendant. The trial
Court decreed the suit on 30th April, 1962, styling it as preliminary decree.
The defendant vendor was directed tto execute and register the deed of sale
in favour of the plaintiff on receipt of the amount stated in the order within
30 days of date failing which the plaintiff appellant was directed to file in
Court, within 15 days after the expiry of 30 days, the draft of conveyance
with stamp therefor. The decree was drawn up on 15·5·1962. The appellant
did not comply with the terms of the decree but sought some directions from
the Court regarding the excess land and a Commissioner was appointed on
14-5-1964. On 26-8-65, the Court directed the plaintiff appellant to deposit
the amount in Court by 22·9·1965; but the appellant filed a revision appli·
cation before the High Court which was dismissed on 8-1-1968. The High
Court granted 3 weeks' time for depositing the amount and again further
time till 8-2-1968. The appellant deposited the money on 6-2-68 and there-
upon the vendor defendant No. 1 made an application on ·25·3·1968 request·
ing the Court to draw the final decree so as to enable her to prefer first
appeal. This application was rejected by the Court on 27th March 1968, and
thereafter she preferred First Appeal to the High Court on 11-4-1968 and
filed an application for condonation of delay, if any, on 8·8·1972.
The High Court held that the appeal was barred by limitation; but on the
facts of the case condoned the delay as sufficient cause having been shov.rn,
and examined the appeal on merits and allowed the appeal.
D
E
F
G
H
840
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1978] 2 S·C·R·
A
Dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, ,by special leave, the Court
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
HELD
(1) '(a) Discretion is conferred on the Court. before which an
application for condonation of delay is made and if the Court after keeping
in view relevant principles exercises its discretion granting relief unless it is
shown to b-e mrinifestly unjust or perverse the Supreme Court would be loathe
to interfere \vith it.
[847 C-D]
(b) It is un'doubt$!dly true that in dealing \vith the question of condc\1-
ing the delay under.section 5, the party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court
that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making
the
application within the prescribed time and tExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.