SAJJAN SINGH versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 630 · Decided: 28-08-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.K. DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 7 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1963 
August 28 
630 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
. [1964] 
SAJJAN SINGH 
ti. 
THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C. J., M. HmAYATULLAH AND K. C. DAs 
GUPTA, JJ.) 
CorrUption-Criminal misconduct in discharge of official duty-
Conviction based on presumption-Validity-Prevention of Corrup.-
tion Act, 1947, (2 of 1947), s. 5(3). 
The appellant was an overseer and then became a Sub-Divi-
sional Officer in the Irrigation Department. On the basis of a com-
plaint, a case was registered against him and after sanction by the 
Government had been obtained for his prosecution under s. 5(2) 
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161/165 of the Indian 
Penal Code he was tried by the special judge on a charge under 
s. 5(2) of the Act. 
The allegation made was that the appellant 
demanded his cununission fron1 
the - contractors oh the cheques 
issued to them and on refusal, he started with-hol\ling their pay-
ments and putting obstacles in the smooth execution of the work 
entrusted to them. 
The commission was then paid from time 
to time and the payments were fully entered in the regular Rokar 
and Khata Bhais. The trial court accepted the prosecution case and 
found that the total pecuniary resources and property in appellant's 
possession or in the possession of his wife and son were dispropor~ 
tionate to his known sources of income and that such possession 
had not been satisfactorily accounted for. 
On these findings the 
presumption under s. 5(3) of the Prevention of Corru]tion Act 
was raised and 
the 
appellant was 
convicted and sentenced to 
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in 
default, rigorous imprisonment for six months. 
On appeal, the 
conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court. 
The 
two learned Judges of the High Court, however, differed on the 
question v..·hether pecuniary resources and property acquired before 
the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force, could be taken 
into consideration for the purpose of s. 5(3) of the Act. 
Held, that to take into consideration the pecuniary resources 
or property in the possession of the accused or any other person 
on his behalf which were acquired before the date of the Act, was 
in no way giving the Act a retrospective operation. 
Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, 
11th Edition, 
p. 210 
and State of Barnaby v. Vishnu Rarnchandra, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 26, 
relied on. 
Sub-section 3 of s. 5 does not create a new kind of offence. 
l 
.... 
It merely prescribes a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving 
the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1) for which 
an accused person is already under trial. 
C.S.D. Swamy v. The State, [1960] I S.C.R. 461 and Sura/-
...
pal Singh v. State of U.P. [ 19611 2 S.C.R. 971, relied on. 
1 
• 
i 
4 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
631 
On proper construction of the words of the section and giving 
them their plain and natural meaning, it is clear, that the pecuinary 
resources and property in possession of the accused person or any 
other person on his behalf have to be taken into consideration for 
the purpose of s. 5(3), whether these were acquired before 
or 
after the Act came into force. 
While it is quite true that pecuniary resources and property are 
themselves sources of income, that does not present any difficulty 
in understanding a position that at a particular point of time the 
total pecuniary resources or property can be regarded as assets, 
and an attempt being made to see whether the known sources of 
income, including, it m_ay be, these very items of property, in the 
past, could yield such income as to explain reasonably the emer· 
gence of these assets at this point of time. 
There is no warrant for the proposition that where the law 
provides that in certain circumstances a presumption shall be made 
against the accused, the prosecution is barred from adducing evi· 
dence in support of its case if it wants to rely on the presumption . 
D. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280; 80 L. ed. 229 and 
Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland, [1961] 3 All 
E.R. 523, held inapplicable. 
The facts proved in this case raise a presumption under s. 5 (3) 
of the Act and the appellant's conviction must be maintained on 
the basis of that presumption. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 98 of 1960. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order 
dated January 20, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in Cri-
minal Appeal No. 683 of 1957. 
I

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