SAHIB SINGH MEHRA versus STATE OF ULTAR PRADESH

Citation: [1965] 2 S.C.R. 823 · Decided: 22-01-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RAGHUBAR DAYAL · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SAHIB SINGH MEHRA 
v. 
STATE OF UlTAR PRADESH 
I anuary 22, 1965 
[RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ,] 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 499 and 500--Puf>.. 
B 
/Jcation of statement defom<llory of Public prosecuting stafJ at A/Jgarh-
State Government giving sanction for prosecution under s. 198B(c) 
Code of Criminal Procedure-Whether A/igarh Prosecuting staff a 'collec-
tion of persons' within the meaning of Explanation 2, s. 499-Considered 
whether remarks published for public good. 
The appellant published in his paper, which had a circulation mainly 
in Aligarh, a statement to the effect that Public Prosecutors and Aasi!-
C 
tant Public Prosecutors had been receiving bribes, 
The Public Prosecutor and the 11 Assistant Public Prosecutors at 
Aligarh obtained the sanction of the State Government as required under 
s. 198B(c) of Code of Criminal Procedure to file a complaint nnder 
s. 500 Indian Penal Code in a court of Sessions against the appellant 
for publishing defamatory remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecutor 
S, of District Aligarh and olher police prooecuting staff of the Govern-
D 
ment in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions. 
The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and the High Court 
dismissed his appeal against the conviction. 
It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, that the sanction 
granted under s. 198B(c) was not the sanction contemplated by law because 
it was a general sanction and not with respect to the defamation of any 
particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor; for the purpooe 
of an offence under s. 500 Indian Penal Code the person defamed mu.tt be 
E 
an individual or a particular group and there was no evidence that the 
remarks were defamatory of any particular group; that the prosecution did 
not lead any evidence to establi.•h that the defamed group had any reputa-
tion which could be harmed; and that in any event the remarks were for 
public good. 
HELD : (i) the sanction given by the Government was specifically 
with respect to the defamation of S, the Assistant Public Prosecutor, 
Aligarh, and the other prosecuting staJf of the Government and as such 
F 
it could not be considered a general sanction not contemplated by law. [826 
HJ 
The sanction given could be taken to be sanction in respect of the 
defamation of the entire Prosecution staff in the State; there was there-
fore no force in the contention that the Public Prosecutor was not com-
petent to restrict his complaint to the defamation of S, and other Public 
Prosecuting staff of the State Government at Aligarh. 
Furthermore, 
G 
although the impugned article did not contain any express reference to the 
prosecuting staff at Aligarh, the offending remarks could properly 
be 
taken to refer t& the prosecuting staff at Aligarh in the context of the 
paper being a local weekly and the other circumstances of the case. [827 
C.E] 
(ii) Explanation II to s. 499 makes it clear that there can be a 
defamation of an individual pe1'0n and also of a 'collection of persons'. 
Such a collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could 
H 
with cartainty say that the particular group had been defamed as dis-
tin~ from the rest of the community. 
The prosecuting staft' of 
Aligarh, and even the prosecuting staff in the State of U.P. would be such 
an identifiable group or 'collection of persons'. [827 0-H; 828 A-CJ 
lASup. 65-6 
.. :•:-' 
824 
SUPllBMB COURT llBPORTS 
[1965) 2 S.C.R. 
(ill) The impugned remarks were per se 'defamatory of the group 
A 
of persons referred to. The tenor of the article did not indicate that the 
purpose of the appellant in publishing these remarks was "public good''. 
No enquiry could have been started by that Government on such a pub-
lication implying the acceptance of bribes by the prosecuting stall'. The 
impugned remarks could lead readers to believe or suspect that the 
Public Prosecutors were corrupt and thus affected the reputation of the 
prosecuting staff adversely. 
Unless proved otherwise, the presumption ie 
S 
that every person bas a good reputation. [828 E-H] 
The lower courts were therefore right in rejecting the contention 
that the impugned remarks were protected under Exceptions 3 and 9 
to s. 499 I.P.C. and in convicting the appellant. [829 B-D) 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
47 of 1963. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated C 
J~uar

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