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SAGUFA AHMED & ORS. versus UPPER ASSAM PLYWOOD PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. & ORS.

Citation: [2020] 9 S.C.R. 472 · Decided: 18-09-2020 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.A. BOBDE · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 9 S.C.R.
SAGUFA AHMED & ORS.
v.
UPPER ASSAM PLYWOOD PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3007-3008 of 2020)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2020
[S. A. BOBDE, CJI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Companies Act, 1956:
s. 421(3) Proviso – Delay of more than 45 days – In filing
appeal – Against order of National Company Law Tribunal –
Application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal dismissed
by Appellate Tribunal – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Appellate
Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay only upto period of
45 days – The delay beyond 45 days could not have been condoned
even in view of the order of the Supreme Court whereby the period
of limitation was extended in view of Covid-19 pandemic.
Maxims:
‘Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt’ –
Applicability of.
Limitation Act, 1963:
s. 4 – Expression ‘prescribed period’ under – Connotation of
– Held: The expression denotes period of limitation and not the
period during which the Court/ Tribunal has discretion to allow a
person to institute the proceedings.
Words and Phrases:
Expression “prescribed period’ – Meaning of, in the context
of s.4 of Limitation Act, 1963.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is true that the period of limitation of 45
days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from
the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made
available to the person aggrieved. It is also true that under Section
420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled
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[2020] 9 S.C.R. 472
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to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost.
Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy
application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in
terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly
justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from
which limitation would start running. But the appellants, chose
to apply for a certified copy after 27 days of the pronouncement
of the order in their presence and they now fall back upon Section
421(3). [Paras 13 and 14][477-D-F]
1.2 From 19.12.2019, the date on which a certified copy
was admittedly received by the counsel for the appellants, the
period of limitation cannot be stopped from running. From
19.12.2019, the date on which the counsel for the appellants
received the copy of the order, the appellants had a period of 45
days to file an appeal. This period expired on 02.02.2020. By
virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal
was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of 45 days.
This period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it
expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The
appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but
filed it on 20.07.2020. The lock down was imposed only on
24.03.2020. [Paras 15, 16 and 17][477-G-H; 478-A-B]
2.1 To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before
18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated
23.03.2020 wherein this Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of
the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on
account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that might be
faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/
applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period
of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or
under Special Laws (both Central and/or State). What was
extended by the above order of this Court was only “the period
of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned
in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order
was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due
to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings
within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special
law. The law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of
SAGUFA AHMED & ORS. v. UPPER ASSAM PLYWOOD
PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. & ORS.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 9 S.C.R.
which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which
means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about
their rights and not those who sleep over them. Therefore, the
appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order passed by this
Court on 23.03.2020, for enlarging, even the period up to which
delay can be condoned. [Paras 18, 19 and 25][478-C-E; 479-B-
C; 48

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