SAGHIR AHMAD versus THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS.
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- - ยท S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 707 The learned Attorney-General argued that Ram Narain was a native Indian subject of Her Majesty before the 15th August, 1947, and that description continued to apply to him after the 15th August, 1947, whether he was in India or in Pakistan, but we think that the. description 'Native subject of Her Majesty' after the 15th of August, 1947, became applicable m the territory now constituted India only to residents of provinces within the boundaries of India, and in Pakistan to residents of provinces within the boundaries of Pakistan and till the time that Ram Narain actually landed on the soil of India and took up permanent residence therein he cannot be described to be domiciled m India or even a Native Indian subject of His Majesty domiciled in India. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the decision of the High Court that Ram Narain could not be tried in any Court in India for offences committed in Mailsi in November, 1947, is right and that the Provincial Government had no power under section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, to accord sanction to his prosecution. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. SAGHIR AHMAD ti. THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS. (With Connected Appeal) [M1mR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.] Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1) (g), 19(6), 31(2), 301- Highway-lts origin and use-Citizen's rights in respect of high- ways-Vis-a-vis the State-State's right to control highway-Limit of such control-Constitution of India (First Amendment) Act, 1951 "'" -U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U. P. Act II of 1951)-Whether ultra vires the Constit,~tion-Subsequent amendment of Constitution if can validate a prior unconstitutional Act. 1954 Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain. Mahajan C. ], 1954 October I3f 1954 Sa1hfr. Ahmad v. The State of . U.P. and Olhtrs. 708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] A highway hasยท its origin, apart fro1n statute, in dedication either express or implied, by the owner of land of a right of passage over it to the public and the acceptance thereof by the public. Dedication is presumed by long and uninterrupted user of a way by the public. The presumption in such cases is so strong as to dispense with all enquiry into the actual ownership of the land or the intention of the owner about its user. All public streets and roads vest in the State, but the State holds them as trustees on behalf of the public. The members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of right _ a~nd this right is limited only by the similar rights possessed by every other citizen to use the pathways. The State as trustees on behalf of the public is entitled to in1pose all such limitations on the character and extent of the user as may be requisite for protecting the rights of the public generally ; but subject to such limitations the right of a citizen to carry on business in transport vehicles on public path\vays cannot be denied to him on the ground that the State owns the highways. G. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras ((1952] 2 M. L. J. 894) referred to with appronl. - Within the limits imposed by State regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of vehicles. lt is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Art. 19(1) (g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is pennissible under clause (6) of <" that articl'!. Article 19(6) as the result of the Constitution (First Amend- ment) Act, 1951, enables the State to carry on any trade or business either by itself or through corporations owned or control- led by the State to the exclusion of private citizens wholly or in part. This provision of Art. 19(6), which was introduced by the an1endment of the Constitution. in 1951, was not in existence when the U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U. P. Act II of 1951), was passed and therefore the validity of the impugned Act is not to be decided by applying the provisions of the new clause. A1nendment of the Constitution which came later cannot be invoked to validate an earlier legislation \Vhich 1nust be regarded
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