SADHU SINGH versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION
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A " ....... -'lllf.'( B โข t c D , E โข F G H SADHU SINGH v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION lune 1, 1965 [J. c. SHAH, J. (VACATION JUDGE)] 243 Defence of India Rules, 1962, Rules 30(1), 30-A(6)(b), 30-A(B)- Review of order of detention within six months-Order of review wh~th~r quasi-judicial---Opportunity to detenu to make representation whether necessary. The petitioner was detained under an order of detention passed by the Diatrict Magistrate of Delhi under r. 30(1) of the Defence of India Rules, .1962 on 5th September, 1964. The order was confirmed by the Adminis- trator under r. 30-A6(b) on the same date. Within six months i.e. on February 24, 1965, the Administrator reviewed the order under r. 30- A(8) and confirmed it. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the order under r. 30-A(8). In support of the petition it was urged that (1) Even it the proceedings under r. 30(1) and r. 30A6(b) may be purely adminiatrative, a proceeding for review under r. 30A(8) is q_uasi-judicial in character. (2) An order of review involves judicial consideration of the facts on which the original detention order was based in the light of subsequent developments including change of views on the part of the det.enu, and this cannot be eff'i!ctively made unless the detenu is afforded an opportunity to make a representation. (3) Every order made by a public authority which affects the rights of an individual must of n~ sity be preceded by a quasi-judicial determination of the question on the determination of which the order may be made, and a determination made contrary to the rule of natural justice is liable to be struck down by order ot a competent court. ( 4) The use of the word 'decide' in cl. (8) of Rule 30-A implies the existence of a lis between the State and the detenu relating to the right of the State to continue to d-etain him after the period of six months contemplated by the statute. (5) The Administrator had reviewed his own order under s. 30-A6(b) and not the order under r. 30(1) and thus there was no compliance with r. 30-A(8). HELD : (i) It was not open to this C',ourt to review the order under r. 30A ( 8). Making of an order of detention proceeds upon the subjective satisfaction of the prescribed authority in the light of the circumstances placed before him or on his coming to know that it is necessary to detain the person concerned with a view to preventing such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to th-e defence of India or civil defence, the maintenance of public order etc. If that order is purely executive and not o.pen to review by the Courts, a review of the very circumstances in which the order was made in the light of the circum- stances since the date of that order cannot but be regarded as an executive order. [248 F-HJ (ii) There is no provision in the statute that the reviewing authority mm! before making the order under r. 30A(8) give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and no such safeguard is implicit in the scheme of the statute. [249 CJ A writ of certiorari lies whenever a body of persons having Jogal authority lo determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having 244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966) I S.C.R. the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority; il doea not lie to remove or adjudicate upon the order which is of an administrative or ministerial nature. [249 DJ Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and Ors. (1950] S.C.R. 621, relied on. (iii) There is no principle or authority in support of the view that whenever a public authority is invested with power to make an order which prejudicially affects the rights of an individual whatever may be the nature of the power cxerci:,eJ, whate\Cf may be the procedure prescribed and whatever may be the nature of the authoriยทiy conferred, the proceed- ings of the public aulhorlty musl be regulaied by the analogy of Nies governing judicial determination of disputed que;tions. [253 C-D] Ridge v. Baldwin and Or.<. L.R. [1964] A.C. 40, explained. Re:c v. Electricity Com1nissioner, Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Comprmy, [1924] I K.B. 171, Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Clzurch Assemhly, Ex Parte Haynes-Smitlz, [1928] I K.B. 411 and Nakkuda Ali v. layara:rze [ 1951] A.C. 66, referred to. (iv) The word 'decide' used in r. 30-A(8) d
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