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SADHU SINGH versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Citation: [1966] 1 S.C.R. 243 · Decided: 01-06-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SADHU SINGH 
v. 
DELHI ADMINISTRATION 
lune 1, 1965 
[J. c. SHAH, J. (VACATION JUDGE)] 
243 
Defence of India Rules, 1962, Rules 30(1), 30-A(6)(b), 30-A(B)-
Review of order of detention within six months-Order of review wh~th~r 
quasi-judicial---Opportunity to detenu to make representation whether 
necessary. 
The petitioner was detained under an order of detention passed by the 
Diatrict Magistrate of Delhi under r. 30(1) of the Defence of India Rules, 
.1962 on 5th September, 1964. The order was confirmed by the Adminis-
trator under r. 30-A6(b) on the same date. 
Within six months i.e. on 
February 24, 1965, the Administrator reviewed the order under r. 30-
A(8) and confirmed it. 
The petitioner thereafter filed a petition under 
Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the 
order under r. 30-A(8). 
In support of the petition it was urged that 
(1) Even it the proceedings under r. 30(1) and r. 30A6(b) may be purely 
adminiatrative, a proceeding for review under r. 30A(8) is q_uasi-judicial 
in character. 
(2) An order of review involves judicial consideration of 
the facts on which the original detention order was based in the light of 
subsequent developments including change of views on the part of the 
det.enu, and this cannot be eff'i!ctively made unless the detenu is afforded 
an opportunity to make a representation. 
(3) Every order made by a 
public authority which affects the rights of an individual must of n~ 
sity be preceded by a quasi-judicial determination of the question on 
the determination of which the order may be made, and a determination 
made contrary to the rule of natural justice is liable to be struck down 
by order ot a competent court. 
( 4) The use of the word 'decide' in cl. 
(8) of Rule 30-A implies the existence of a lis between the State and 
the detenu relating to the right of the State to continue to d-etain him 
after the period of six months contemplated by the statute. 
(5) The 
Administrator had reviewed his own order under s. 30-A6(b) and not the 
order under r. 30(1) and thus there was no compliance with r. 30-A(8). 
HELD : (i) It was not open to this C',ourt to review the order under 
r. 30A ( 8). Making of an order of detention proceeds upon the subjective 
satisfaction of the prescribed authority in the light of the circumstances 
placed before him or on his coming to know that it is necessary 
to detain the person concerned with a view to preventing such person 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to th-e defence of India or civil 
defence, 
the maintenance of public order etc. 
If that order is purely 
executive and not o.pen to review by the Courts, a review of the very 
circumstances in which the order was made in the light of the circum-
stances since the date of that order cannot but be regarded as an executive 
order. 
[248 F-HJ 
(ii) There is no provision in the statute that the reviewing authority 
mm! before making the order under r. 30A(8) give an opportunity to the 
detenu to make a representation and no such safeguard is implicit in the 
scheme of the statute. [249 CJ 
A writ of certiorari lies whenever a body of persons having Jogal 
authority lo determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having 
244 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1966) I S.C.R. 
the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority; il doea not 
lie to remove or adjudicate upon the order which is of an administrative 
or ministerial nature. [249 DJ 
Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and Ors. (1950] S.C.R. 621, 
relied on. 
(iii) There is no principle or authority in support of the view that 
whenever a public authority is invested with power to make an order 
which prejudicially affects the rights of an individual whatever may be the 
nature of the power cxerci:,eJ, whate\Cf may be the procedure prescribed 
and whatever may be the nature of the authoriยทiy conferred, the proceed-
ings of the public aulhorlty musl be regulaied by the analogy of Nies 
governing judicial determination of disputed que;tions. [253 C-D] 
Ridge v. Baldwin and Or.<. L.R. [1964] A.C. 40, explained. 
Re:c v. Electricity Com1nissioner, Ex parte London Electricity Joint 
Committee Comprmy, [1924] I K.B. 171, Rex v. Legislative Committee of 
the Clzurch Assemhly, Ex Parte Haynes-Smitlz, [1928] I K.B. 411 and 
Nakkuda Ali v. layara:rze [ 1951] A.C. 66, referred to. 
(iv) The word 'decide' used in r. 30-A(8) d

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