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S.V. SIVASWAMI SERVAI versus HAFEZ MOTOR TRANSPORT (FIRM) AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] 3 S.C.R. 802 · Decided: 17-08-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: L.M. SHARMA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
S.V. SIVASWAMI SERVA! 
v. 
HAFEZ MOTOR TRANSPORT (FIRM) AND ORS. 
A 
AUGUST 17, 1990 
B 
[L.M. SHARMA AND J.S. VERMA, JJ.] 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: Section 47(3)-Grant of permit-Basis 
for-Permits in exce» of routes determined-Whether permissible-
Agreement between rival parties in a tis-Whether can be basis for. 
_,_ 
c 
The appellant and 14 others, inclnding respondent No. I applied 
for grant of a stage carriage permit. The R. T .A. rejected the applica-
!ions of respondent No. I and some others on the only ground that each 
of them had been granted one other permit in the same sitting, and 
granted the permit to the appellant for a period of three years. On 
appeal by respondent No. I and some others, the State Transport 
~ 
D Appellate Tribunal, set aside the R. T .A.'s order and granted the 
permit in favour of responent No. I. The appellant and another unsuc-
cessful applicant filed two civil revision petitions. The High Court, by 
an interim order, stayed the Tribunal's order and directed that the 
appellant as well as respondent No. I be allowed to operate on the 
route, but ultimately dismissed both the revision petitions. 
E 
The appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court. By 
' 
virtue of this Court's interim order, the appellant and respondent No. I 
were continuing to operate on the route throughout; as a result, though 
the permit granted for three years expired long back, both the clai-
man ts had been operating on the route all these years. 
F 
• 
On behalf of the parties common request was made for remanding 
the matter to the R.T.A. for fresh decision on merits and for a direction 
to allow both the parties to ply their stage carriages on the route on the 
~ 
ground that there was necessity for two permits on the route. 
G 
Allowing the appeal, this Court, 
HELD: 1.1 The grant of a permit is to be made by the R. T .A. 
primarily with reference to the object of serving the interests of the 
general public and other relevant factors. It cannot be treated as a 
dispute relating to grant of a permit between the rival claimants only. It 
I-
H is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of conflicting interests of 
802 
S.V. S!VASWAMI v. MOTOR TPT. (FIRM) 
803 
private individuals alone. That apart, under Section 47(3) of the Motor 
Vehicles Act, 1939, the R. T .A. is first required to determine the 
-"'number of stage carriages for the route and then to grant permits 
according to that determination made earlier. Grant of any permit in 
excess thereof was not permissible without first making a fresh deter-
mination and increasing the number, if necessary. [807E-G I 
1.2 Therefore, an order allowing two claimants, to )lly their 
stage carriages on a single route on the basis of agreement between 
S--- .them that there is necessity for two permits cannot be made unless the 
~ 
· 
grant of a permit to both the rival claimants would be within the limit 
fixed by the R.T.A. at the relevant time. The grant of a permit is not a 
matter which can be decided merely on the basis of an agreement bet-
ween the two rival claimants who _alone out of several claimants remain 
in the lis at this stage. [807H & F] 
M. Chinnaswamy v. Mjs. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) 
Ltd., [1977] 2 sec 629; Civil Appeal No. JJ33 of 1970 decided on 
9. 12. 1981 and Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1980 decided on 13. 7. 1990, 
distinguished. 
1.3 The fact that the claimants had the benefit of plying their 
stage carriages for several years on the basis of interim orders of the 
Court or other authorities long after the period of the permit had 
expired, is not a valid reason for perpetuating that act and confining the 
grant only to the litigants before the ·court when claimants for the 
permit were many and are likely to be many in case the qustion of grant 
at this point of time is decided afresh. Admittedly, the appellants for 
permit before the R. T .A. were many more and when the matter is to be 
considered afresh by the R.T.A. everyone of them is entitled to a fresh 
consideration of his claim on merits. [808B:D I 
1.4 The grant of permit by the R. T .A. to the appellant refusing to 
consider the claim of respondent No. 1 and some other applicants on 
merits solely on the ground that they had been granted one other permit 
in the same sitting is clearly untenable. The grant of a permit for 
another route to the respondent No. 1 and some others could only be a 
relevant circumstance, while assessing the comparative m

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