S.S. RATHORE versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [1989] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 43 · Decided: 06-09-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

S.S. RA1HORE 
A 
v. 
STAIB OF MADHYA PRADESH 
SEPlEMBER 6, 1989 
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, CJ, SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, 
B 
RANGANATH MISRA, G.L. OZA, B.C. RAY, K.N. SINGH 
ANDS. NATARAJAN, JJ.) 
) 
Limitation Act, 1963-First Schedule-Articles 58 and 113-
'When the right to sue or cause of action first accrues'-Jnterpretation 
of-Held to be not from the date of original adverse order but from the C 
date when the order on the statutory appeal is made or six months from 
the date of preferring statutory appeal-Statutory appeals to be disposed 
of expeditiously-Ordinarily a period of three to six months to be the 
outer limit. 
The plaintiff-appellant was dismissed from service by the Collec-
D 
tor on 13.1.1966. His departmental appeal was dismissed by the Divi-
sional Commissioner on 31.8.1966. Thereupon the appellant instituted 
a suit on 30.1.1969 asking for a declaration that the order of dismissal 
was inoperative and that he continued to be in service. The suit was 
dismissed by the trial court and that order was upheld by the appellate 
courts. In dismissing the suit the courts below accepted the defence plea 
E 
that it had been filed beypnd the period of limitation prescribed there-
for under Article 58 of the first Schedule of the Limitation Act. Hence 
this appeal. This appeal initially came up for hearing before a Division 
Bench of this Court. At the hearing reliance was placed before a deci-
sion of this Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur & 
Ors., ll959) SCR 1148 in support of the contention that the suit was 
F 
barred by limitation. The Division Bench took the view that the decision 
of this Court rendered by five Judge Bench in Sita Ram Gael's aforesaid 
required reconsideration. This is how the appeal has come up before a 
Seven Judge Bench. The question that fell for determination by the 
Court was 'When was the right to sue first accrued' to the appellant i.e. 
whether from the date when the original adverse order of dismissal was 
G 
passed against him or when the departmental/statutory appeal was 
finally disposed of. The appellant's contention is that the original order 
having merged in the final order whereby his departmental appeal was 
disposed of, the right to sue ace.rued from that date and on this reckon-
ing, the suit filed by him was within time. 
_.J 
H 
43 
44 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 
, 
Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to trial Court, this 
A Court, 
B 
c 
HELD: Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are 
being exercised under the law by tribunals and other constituted 
authorities. [SlH] 
I . 
In respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the court is now 
barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in tribunals and auth-
orities. That being the position, there is no justification for the 
distinctiJ)n between courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of 
t 
·~erger. [SlH; 52A] 
It must be held in the instant case, that the order of dismissal 
made b:t the Collector did merge into the order of the Divisional Com-
missioner when the appellant's appeal was dismissed on 31.8.1966. [528] 
The cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the 
D public servant under the relevant service Rules as to redressal are dis-
posed of. [53B l 
The cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the 
original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher 
authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal 
E or representation is made. Where no such order is made, though 
the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date 
of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall 
be taken_ to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first 
arisen. [53H; 54A] 
I· 
p 
In every such case until the appeal or representatimf provided by 
a law is disposed of, accrual of the cause of action shall first arise only 
when the higher authority makes its order on appeal or representation 
and where such order is not made on the expiry of six mo11ths from the 
date when the appeal was filed or representation was made. [54D I 
G 
Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authori-
ties taken an unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no 
attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not 
considered to be governmental business of substance. This approach 
has to be deprecated and authorities on whom p

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