LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

S. P. JINADATHAPPA versus R. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 22 · Decided: 17-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

April z7. 
22 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1962] 
S. P. JINADATHAPPA 
v. 
R. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, 
K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAh 
and J. R. MUDIIOLKAR, JJ.) 
Rent Control-Allotment of accommodation-Statute a11thorising 
controller to select tenant-Constitutionality of-If violates funda-
mental right of landlord-Discrimination-Guidance for choosing 
tenant-Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, r95r 
(Mys. XXX of r95r}, s. 3(3)(a)-Constitutio1' of India, Arts. r4 
and r9(r)(j). 
Section 30(3}(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommoda-
tion Control Act, r95r, authorised the Controller to select any 
Government, local authority, public institution, officer of a 
government, local authority or public institution or any other per-
son as a tenant of a vacant house. Under the Act the owner was 
bound to let the house to the tenant so selected. The petitioner 
was the owner of a house for whom the controller selected a 
tenant under these provisions. He challenged the constitutiona-
lity of s. 3(3)(a) in so far as the selection of "other persons" 
was authorised on the grounds that: (i) it put an unreasonable 
restriction on his fundamental right to property and (ii) it 
offended Art. I4 of the Constitution as it provided no guidance 
for choosing the tenant and enabled the controller to makt an 
arbitrary choice. 
Held, thats. 3(3)(a) of the Act was valid and did not violate 
Art. r4 or rg(r)(f) of the Constitution. 
An individual was a member of the public and the restric-
tion caused by his selection was in the interest of the general 
public. The restriction was not unreasonable. It was enforced 
only when the owner did not want the house for his own use. 
It could make no reasonable difference to him whether an indi-
vidual was selected or government, local authority, public insti-
tution or any officer of any of these was selected. The Act made 
provision for selection of a suitable tenant. This was further 
securer! by providing for an appeal to the District Judge and 
thereafter a revision petition to the High Court. 
There was ample guidance given in the Act to the Control-
ler to choose a suitable tenant. Every one had been given a 
right to apply for being selected as a tenant; and the owner had 
been given the right to have his views also considered. The 
ultimate decision was a judicial decision, and if required, of the 
highest tribunal in the State. 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: 
Writ Petition No. 71 of 
..ol 
1958. 
r 
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
23 
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution 
of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 
S. K. Venkataranga Ayengar and S. J. S. Fernandez, 
for the petitioner. 
B. R. L. Iyengar, for respondent No. 1. 
R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respon-
dent No. 2. 
1961. 
April 17. The Judgment of the Court was 
delivered by 
S. P. 
J inadathappa 
v. 
R. P. Sharma 
SARKAR, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Con-
Sa.kar J. 
stitution raises a question of the constitutional validity 
of s. 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accom-
modation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore XXX of 1951). 
Shortly put, that provision enables an authority set 
up by the Act to select any Government, local autho-
rity, public institution, officer of a government, local 
authority or public institution or any other person as 
the te11-ant of a vacant house. Under the Act the 
owner is bound to let the premises to the tenant so 
selected. The petitioner, for whom a tenant had been 
selected under this provision, challenges its validity 
on the ground that it puts an unreasonable restriction 
on his fundamental right to property under Art. 
19(l)(f) of the Constitution and is outside the protec-
tion of cl. (5) of that article. 
The petitioner had a building in respect of which he 
had made some sort of arrangement with one Misri 
Lal for the making of certain alterations in it and for 
letting it thereafter to him for the purpose of a board-
ing house. 
He later gave a notice as required by 
s. 3(2)(a) of the Act to respondent No. 2, the Con-
troller, who had the authority under s. 3(3)(a) to select 
a tenant, that the house had become vacant. There-
upon respondent No. 2 considered applications for the 
tenancy of the house of which there were two. One 
was from Misri Lal mentioned above and the other 
was from respondent No. 1, who was a private indivi-
dual carrying on business of a boarding house keeper. 
Respondent No. 2 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.