S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1979] 2 S.C.R. 875 · Decided: 04-01-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: JASWANT SINGH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

' 
S. P. BHATNAGAR ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
January 4, 1979 
[JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
875 
Pre1·e111ion of Corrup•tion Act, 1947 s. S(l)(d) & s. 5(2)-Scope of-Proof 
of guilt based on circumstantial evidence-Tests for deciding. 
Both the appellants were officers of Indian Oil Corporation. 
The Corpora· 
tion invited tenders from experienced contractors for rock cutting, filling and 
levelling of cert2.i1.1 land acuired by it. 
On the notified date it opened the 
tenders received from eleven contractors. 
But in the meantime since it made 
a change in the specification of work to be done it asked the tenderers to sub· 
mit revised tender. 
The direction to submit fresh tt:nders was restricted only 
to the original 11 tenderers. 
Even so it \\'as alleged that a te\1der form was 
issued by the appellants to A-4, who was not one of the 11 tenderers. 
There 
\:Vas age.in a change in the specifr:ation of the work to be done at the sugges-
tion of foreign collaborators. 
The appellants were alleged to have asked the 
concerned officers of the Corporation to make a fresh survey along with A-4, 
keepi•.1g in view the suggestion of the foreign collaborators. EventuaJly ~1-'!.e con-
tract \Vas giYe11 to A-4. 
The prosecution alleged that ( 1) the conduct of the 
appellants showed their keenness to have the contract entrusted to A-4. (2) 
the issue of work order was inflated with :figures relating to rock cutting and 
filling; and ( 3) the appellants removed certain original documents fron1 the 
departmental files at.1d substituted in their pla;ce fabricated material. 
The appellants who were charged with offences under s. 120B and s. 109 
IPC ands. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 
were convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. 
On the question whether the appellants had been rightly convicted 
under 
s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
A11o\ving the appeals, 
HELD : 1. An analysis of the circumstantial evidence adduced by t!le pro-
secution did not lead to the unerring certainty that the appellants acted with 
any dishonest or corrupt motive or abused their position. [904 FJ. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
2. (a) It is well settled that abuse of position, in order to come v1ithin 
G 
the mischief of s. 5(1) (d) of the Act, must necessarily be dishonest so that it 
may be proved that the ar.:cused caused deliberate loss to the department. Fur-
ther it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused, by corrupt 
or i1legal means or by abusing his position, obtained any pecuniary advantage 
for some other person. [892 G; 893 A]. 
(b) Again, the fundamental rule relating to the proof of guilt based on 
circumstantial evidence is that there is always danger that conjecture or su~pi~ 
~ion n1ight take the place of legal proof. 
In such cases the mind is apt to take 
a pleasure in adC:hpting circumstances to one another and even in straining then! a 
H 
876 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[!979] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
little, if need be to force them to forn1 parts of one connected whole and the 
more ingenious the mind of the individual the more likely it is, in considering 
such matters, to over-reach and mislead itself to supply some little link that 
is wanting, to take for gratited some fact consistent with its previo;Js thcoric:s 
and necessary to render them complete. [893 B-D]. 
(c) In cases where the evidence· is of a circumstantial n1ature. the circum-
B 
stances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first 
instance be fu1Jy established, and all the facts so estah!ished should be consis-
tent only \Yith the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. 
Again, t'1e circum-
stances should be of a conclusive nature and should be such as to t:Al'lndc every 
hypothesis but the one proposed, to be proved. In other words there must 
be 
a chain of evidence so far complete as not to give any reasonable ground for 
a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such 
C 
as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by 
the accused. [893 D-F]. 
D 
E 
M. Narayanana Nambiar v. State of Kera/a, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 
724; Maior S. K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 
SC 
822; 
Hanumant Govind Nergundkar v. State of M.P., 
[1952] SCR 1091, 
AIR 1952 SC 343; Palvinder Kaur v. State of Pun;ab, [1953] SCR 
94: AIR 1952 SC 354; Charan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 196' SC 
529; referred to. 
(d) The pri

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