S. M. BANERJI versus SRI KRISHNA AGARWAL

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 289 · Decided: 20-11-1959 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

-
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
289 
measurements of the house for effecting partition of 
i959 
the property, when the plaintiff raised objection, and 
Rukhmabai 
thereafter in 1940, filed the suit. From the aforesaid 
v. 
facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff's right to the Lala Laxminarayan 
property was not effectively threatened by the appel-
and Others 
lant till the Commissioner came to divide the property. 
It was only then there was an effectual threat to his 
Subba Rao f . . 
right to the suit property and the suit was filed within 
six years thereafter. We, therefore, hold that the 
suit was within time. 
In. the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with 
costs. 
Appeal dismissed. 
S. M. BANERJI 
v. 
'SRI KRISHNA AGARWAL 
( B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR 
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.) 
Election Petition-Amendment of-Petition alleging improper 
acceptance of nomination-Amendment introducing ground of non-
compliance with provisions-Whether can be allowed-Discretion of 
Election Tribunal-Interference by High Court in appeal-Repre-
sentation of the People Act, I95I (43 of I95I), ss. 33(3) and IOO. 
The appellant held an office under the Government and was 
dismissed from service on January 24; 1956, for a reason other 
than corruption or disloyalty to the State. He filed his nomin-
ation paper for election to Parliament which did not disclose any 
disqualifications. No objection was taken to the nomination and 
it was accepted without making any enquiry. After the poll 
the appellant was declared duly elected. The respondent filed 
an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on 
the ground, inter alia, that the nomination of the appellant had 
been improperly accepted as he was dismissed from Government 
service and he had failed to obtain a certificate from the Election 
Commission that he had not been dismissed for corruption or 
disloyalty to the State. After limitation for filing the petition 
had expired, the respondent applied to the Election Tribunal for 
amendment of the petition seeking to add to this ground the 
statement that the nomination paper was not accompanied by 
the prescribed certificate. The Tribunal disallowed the amend-
ment on the ground that the amendment sought to introduce a 
\) 
1959 
November zo. 
I959 
S.M. Banerji 
v. 
Sri f(ri!ihna 
Agarwal 
Subba Rao]. 
290 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)] 
new ground after the period of limitation and then dismissed the 
election petition holding that the appellant was qualified to stand 
for the election and his nomination was not improperly accepted. 
On appeal, the High Court held that the amendment should have 
been allowed as it merely asked for a clarification and not the 
introduction of a ne\v ground and consequently it set aside the 
order of the Tribunal and directed a retrial of the issue invoh ed. 
The appellant obtained special leave and appealed. 
field, that the amendment could not be allowed as it sought 
to introduce a new ground in the petition after the period of 
limitation. The ground taken in the petition was that there was 
an improper acceptance of the nomination covered bys. roo(1)(d)(i) 
of the Representation of the People Act, l95I. But there was 
no improper acceptance of the nomination for the nomination 
paper ex facie did not disclose any defect or disqualification. 
There being ·no subsisting prayer seeking to raise the ground 
under S. 100(1 )(d)(iv) for non-compliance with the provisions of 
s. 33(3) of the Act, the amendment was foreign to the scope of 
the enquiry under the ground covered bys. roo(1)(d)(i). 
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Sin.gh, [1955) 
l S.C.R. 267 and Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh [1957) 
S.C.R. 370, followed. 
' 
Veluswami v. Raja Nainar, A.LR. 1959 S.C. 422, referred to. 
There was no jurisdiction in the High Court to interfere with 
the discretion of the Election Tribunal refusing to allow the 
amendment after the entire petition had been disposed of. It is 
undesirable for an appellate Court to interfere with the order of 
a subordinate Tribunal made in the exercise of its discretion 
without exceeding the limits of its powers, unless it has acted 
perversely or has taken a view which is clearly wrong. 
CIVIL 
APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appeal 
No. 301 of 1959. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and 
order dated December 10, 1958, of the Allahabad High 
Court, in First Appeal No. 382 of 1958, aris

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