S. KULDEEP SINGH & ANR versus S. PRITHPAL SINGH

Citation: [2022] 13 S.C.R. 100 · Decided: 02-08-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.M. JOSEPH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 13 S.C.R.
S. KULDEEP SINGH & ANR.
v.
S. PRITHPAL SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 81 of 2011)
AUGUST 2, 2022
[K. M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 – s.2(4), 2(6),
2(7) and 50 – Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Rules, 1973 – r. 5 – Jammu
& Kashmir Agrarian Reforms (Suspension of Operations Act), 1975
– Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 – Registration
Act, 1977 – s.17 – Jammu & Kashmir Transfer of Property Act –
s.138 – Suit for declaration and possession – The Suit was filed for
declaration and possession by the respondent-plaintiff who was
the adopted son of one ‘SS’ (who was the owner of property is in
dispute) – Respondent claimed that he received gifts of land in his
favour from SS – He supported his claim by producing a compromise
deed dated 18.12.1975 in between himself and one ‘AJK’(tenant)
on which there was a thumb impression of SS endorsing the
instrument – Deputy commissioner (DC) passed an order recording
the compromise on 24.12.1975 – The appellant contended that they
are in possession of the land – The District judge passed decree in
favour of plaintiff-respondent, the finding was primarily based on
compromise deed – The first appeal by the appellants herein was
dismissed – The LPA preferred by the appellants was dismissed –
Appellants approached the Supreme Court and contended that the
compromise does not confer any title on the respondent and that
such an instrument requires compulsory registration as per s.17 of
1977 Act and further, that in terms of Section 3 of the Suspension
Act, 1975, the operation of the concerned provisions and all
proceedings thereunder 1972 Act remained in suspension until
30.3.1976 and therefore 18.12.1975 compromise and the DC’s order
dated 24.12.1975 for correction of revenue records based on the
compromise are non-est – Held: With his endorsement on the
compromise, SS intended to give the right of personal cultivation
but the same does not in any manner suggest that SS had intended
to confer title on the respondent – The compromise cannot be treated
as a family arrangement – Furthermore, the compromise and the
[2022] 13 S.C.R. 100
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DC’s consequent Order, was passed in a revenue proceeding thus
the compromise did not fall under the exception category under
Section 17(2)(vi) of – Thus, compromise in order to have legal effect
needed registration under the Registration Act, 1977 – The DC
lacked inherent jurisdiction to either entertain the appeal or endorse
the compromise during the suspended phase – Any order or decree
so passed through such unlawful exercise of power, will be a legal
nullity – Decree in favour of respondent (plaintiff) set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. A. Whether the compromise dated 18.12.1975
confers title?
In order to adjudicate the above issue, this Court needs to
look at the compromise in its intent and functioning. The
compromise between the Plaintiff and tenant was recorded in a
proceeding for correction of revenue records under the 1972
Act and the Rules. There, the Plaintiff was admitted to be the
owner and in possession of land which he personally cultivated.
SS with his thumb impression endorsed the compromise deed.
On this the defendants have contended that the said statement
has to be read in the context in which it was made and how the
parties to the transaction understood the same. The plaintiff says
that his adoptive father SS intended to confer title on the Plaintiff
and SS would not have looked into the definition of “owner” under
the 1972 Act, before making the endorsement on the compromise.
On this, it cannot be ignored that the parties effectuated the
transaction in a proceeding under the 1972 Act. Thus, the
compromise exists within the four corners of the 1972 Act, and
must therefore be read by applying the statutory provisions. [Para
18][116-C-E]
2. The purpose of the compromise decree in the correction
proceedings under Chapter III of the Rules pertain only to
revenue entries, and the possession of land in capacity of a
personal cultivator.  This could hardly confer any lawful title on
the plaintiff over SS’s land. With his endorsement on the
compromise, SS perhaps intended to give the right of personal
cultivation but the same does not in any manner suggest that SS
had intended to confer title on the plaintiff. The land is therefore
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SUPREME COURT 

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