S. K. SARKAR, MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, U.P., LUCKNOW versus VINAY CHANDRA MISRA

Citation: [1981] 2 S.C.R. 331 · Decided: 12-12-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. SARKARIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

, 
' 
- . 
• 
• 
• 
S. K. SARKAR, MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, 
U.P., LUCKNOW 
v. 
VINAY CHANDRA MISRA 
December 12, 1980 
(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
331 
Contemp1 of Courts Act 1971, S. 15(2)-Scope of Contempt of Subordi-
nate or inferior Court-Whether High Court can take suo .motu cognizance 
of and punish . . 
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by section 15(2) empowers the High 
A 
B 
Colut in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court. to take 
C 
cognizance· on a reference made to it by the subordinate court, or on a motion 
made by the Advocate-General, or in relation to a Union Territory by 
the 
notified I.aw Officer. 
In a proceeding under the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act 1950, 
the respondent-advocate, appeared as a counsel before the appellant who was 
a Member of the Board of Revenue to oppooe the vacation of a stay ofder 
D 
filed before the Board . 
. The respondent, in his petition to the High Court under the Contempt of 
Courts, 1971 alleged that in the course of arguments before the appellant in 
the aforesaid proceeding, the appellant got infuriated, lost his temper and 
abused him saying "Nalayak Gadhe Salle ko Jail Bhijwadunga; kis Idiot Ne 
Advocate Bana Diya Hai", and that thereby the appellant had committed 
B 
contempt of his own Court as well as that of the High Court as provided 
in sections 15 and 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act which was punishable 
under section 12 of the said Act. 
Before the High Court, the appellant raised a prelin1inary objection stating 
that the High Court was not competent to take cognizance of the alleged con· 
tempt without any reference from the subordinate Court or without a motion 
by the Advocate-General as envisaged by section 15(2) of the Act. The High 
Court rejected the preliminary objection and held that the application was 
n1aintainable. 
Jn the appeal to this Court, on the question whether the High Court can 
take suo mo tu cognizance of contempt of subordinate /inferior Court when it 
F 
is not moved in either of the two mcxles mentioned in section 15(2) of the 
G 
Act. 
HELD : I. Sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 
1971, does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of and 
punish contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion [339 A] 
2. In the facts of the instant case the High Court has not acted improperly 
or illegally in taking suo motu cognizance, on the petition of the respondent-
H 
advocate. 
[340 C] 
332 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1981] 2 s.c.R. 
' 
A 
3. Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and 
the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power 
'"' 
to punish the contempt of itself. 
Parliament has, by virtue of Entry 77 
of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule, and Entry 14 of List Ill of the Seventh Sche-
dule, power to define and Jimit the power of the Courts in punishing contempt 
of Court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. 
[337 A·B] 
Mohd. lkranz Hussain v. The Stale of U.P., A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1625 referred 
B 
to. 
f) 
F 
G 
H 
4. Section 15 does not specify the basis or the sources of the inforni::1tion 
on which the High Court can act on its own motion. If the High Court acts 
on information derived from its own sources, such as on a perusal of the records 
of a .subordinate court or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public 
speech, without there being any reference from the subordinate court or the 
Advocate-General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion. 
But if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private person feel-
ing aggrieved, not being the Advocate-General, the High Court, has, a discre-
tion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion 
on the basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. 
If. the petitioner 
is a responsible member of the legal profe~ion, it nray act suo motu. [339B-E] 
'· If the High Court is pri1na .facie satisfied that the information received 
by it regarding the commission of contempt of a subordinate court is not fri-
volous, and the contempt alleged is not merely technical or trivial, it may, in 
its discretion, act suo motu and commence the proceedings against the rontem-
ner. 
However, this mode of taking suo n1otu cognizance of contempt of 
a 
subordinate court should be resorted to sparingly where the contempt concerned 
is of a grave and serious natur

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.