RUTH SOREN versus MANAGING COMMITTEE, EAST I.S.S.D.A. AND ORS.
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RUTH SOREN v. MANAGING COMMITTEE, EAST J.S.S.D.A. AND ORS. NOVEMBER 30, 2000 [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] Labour laws: Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953: Section 26(2)- "Establishment"-Educational institution- Applicability of-Held; The word "Establishment is not as wide as "industry" defined under Industrial Disputes Act-Hence, educational institution does not fall with in the scope of "establishment"-lndustria/ Disputes Act, 1947. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 19(1)(g). Education-Imparting of-Held: Though such an activity may be an industry yet it is not a profession, trade or business for the purpose of Art, 19(/)(g). Words and Phrases: "Establishment"-Meaning of-In the context of S.26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953. A B c D E The appellant filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 challenging the F termination of her service by respondent No. I which was an establishment running an educational institution. The Labour Court allowed the application. Respondent No. I filed an appeal before the High Court challenging the aforesaid decision on the ground that respondent No.I was not an establishment G for the purposes pf the Act and, therefore, the application filed by the appellant was incompetent The High Court allowed the appeal. Hence this appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court. HELD: I.I. An 'establishment' for the purposes of the Bihar Shops H 179 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R . . A and Establishments Act, 1953 means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary thereto. Concept of industry, as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would include any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, B employment, handicraft, industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. There is an organized activity between employers and employees to impart education. Such an activity, though may be industry, will not be a profession, trade or business for the purposes of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and would not be one falling within the scope of 'establishment' under the Act. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is unexceptionable. (182-D-El c Unnikrishnan JP v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993[ l SCC 645, relied on. Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, (1960) 1 LLJ 523; University of Delhi v. Ramnath, (1963) 2 LLJ 335 and Federated Municipal D & Shire Employees' Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation, 26 CLR 508, referred to. Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (19781 2 sec 213, held inapplicable. E 2. The question for consideration in this case is whether educational institution falls within the definition of 'establishment' carrying on business, trade or profession or incidental activities thereto. 'i:stablishment', as defined under the Act, is not as wide as 'industry' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. [183-A] f CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 513 of 2000. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.98 of the Patna High Court in L.P.A. No. 15of1989. S.B. Upadhyay, Pawan Upadhyay, Tathagat H. Vardhan, Ms. Shweta G Verma and Amar K. Roy for the appellant S.K.Sinha for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAJENDRA BABU, J. The services of the appellant employed in the establishment of respondent No. I were terminated on 25.8.1980. She made an H application under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops & Establishments Act, RUTH SOREN v. MANAGING COMMITTEE, EAST l.S.S.D.A. [RAJENDRA BABU, J.J 18! 1953 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] before the Labour Court, Ranchi A questioning the correctness of the same. The Labour Court allowed the same by directing her reinstatement in service with full back wages and continuity in service. This order made by the Labour Court was called in question in a writ petition, which on dismissal by a learned Single Judge, was carried in further appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. Two contentions were put forth before the appellate court, firstly that respondent No.1 is not an establishment for the purposes of the Act and, therefore, the application filed by the appellant is incompetent and secondly that respondent No. I terminated her ser
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