LexRULI RAM AND ANR. versus STATE OF HARYANA
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A RULi RAM AND ANR. STATE OF HARYANA SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 B [K.G. BALA KRISHNAN AND ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.] ·' Penal Code, 1860: Sections 299, 300, 302 & 304 Part-II: Murder of two children- C Conviction under Section 304 Part-II-High Court convicted the accused under Section 302-0n appeal, held, intention of the accused was not to commit murder but the accused could be attributed the knowledge that natural and proper consequences of their acts were likely to cause death- However, High Court did not indicate any basis to cover the case under D Section 302-Under the circumstances, it is proper to apply provisions of Section 304 Part-II. Clause (b) of Section 299 and clauses (2) & (3) of Section 300- Distinction between-Discussed. E Sentencing: F Principle of just desert-Proportion between crime and punishment- Purpose-Punishment acts as a deferent for the accused, it should be proportionate to the crime-ft serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. According to the prosecution, two young boys were thrown into a pond by the accused- appellants. The boys were taken to the hospital, where they were declared dead. Accused allegedly committed the crime because of refusal by the family members of the deceased to cast their votes in favour of the candidate supported by the accused, in the Panchayat election. Accused- G appellants were tried for offence u/s 302 IPC. H Trial Court convicted the accused-appellants under Section 304 Part-II IPC. High Court allowed the State appeal and convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC. Hence this appeal. 426 .. RULi RAM v. ST A TE OF HAR Y ANA 427 It was contended for the appellants that evidence were not credible; that A witnesses were partisan and biased; that no case under Section 302 IPC was made out; and that the maximum sentence, as awarded, was highly disproportionate since one of the accused ·was aged 80 years. On behalf of the State, it was contended that Section 304 Part-II I PC could not be applied when none of the exceptions to Section 300 cover the B instant case. Partly allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The trial Court and the High Court analysed the evidence in detail and have held it to be plausible and acceptable, and that it suffers C from no infirmity. It has been noted that in a faction ridden village, independent witnesses are difficult to get. Enmity is a double sword. While it can be basis for false implication, it can also be basis for the crime. The Court has to weigh the evidence carefully and if after doing so, holds the evidence to be acceptable, the accused cannot take the plea that it should not be acted upon. When a D plea of false implication is advanced by the accused, foundation for the same has to be established. (431-E, F, G( 1.2. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms E used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. (432-C, DI 1.3. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause F (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not, in the ordinary way of nature, be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. G 1433-D, E, Fl H 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A 1.4. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. The distinction lies betwee
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