ROSHAN LAL & ORS. versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1965] 2 S.C.R. 316 · Decided: 03-12-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

316 
ROSHAN LAL & ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
December 3, 1964 
[A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND 
R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.] 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s. 201-Removal of evi-
dence of crime to screen offender-Maximum punishment under 1ectlon 
whether tu be with reference to offence found to have been committed or 
offenc. 'believed' to have been committed. 
Tue three appellants were prosecuted for various offences under the 
Indian Penal Code and acquitted by the trial court, On appeal, the High 
Coun of Punjab convicted one of the appellants under ss: 330 and 148 of 
the Code and all the appellants under s. 201 of the Code while acquitting 
them in respect of the charge under s. 304. The sentence passed under 
s. 201 was three years rigorous imprisonment each, the coun holding ihat 
A 
B 
c 
the apP"Jlants had removed evidence of the offence culpable homicide. In 
appeal to the Supreme Coun by special leave, the appellants contended 
that the only offences proved to have been committed were under ss. 330 D 
and 348 and therefore the fourth paragraph of s. 201 applied and under 
it the sentence could not exceed one-fourth of the longest term of imprison-
ment of the offences under ss. 330 and 348 which worked out at one year 
and nine months. 
The contention of the respondent State on the other 
hand was that the term of imprisonment that could be imposed under 
s. 201 did not depend on the actual offence committed the evidence of 
which had been destroyed but on what the accused belieYed that offence 
to have been and therefore the sentence imposed in the present case was 
E 
fully Within its terms. It was stressed that the words in the first paragraph 
of s. 201 were "knowing or having reason to believe that an offence had 
been committed," but in the second paragraph the words were "knows 
or believes to have been committed." 
HELD (Per Rajagopala Ayyangar and Bachawat, JJ.) (i) The expression 
"knowing or having reason to believe" in the fint paragraph and tho 
expression "knows or believes" in the second paragraph are used in the 
F 
same sense. If it be supposed that the word "believes" was used in a 
sense different from the expression "having reason to believe", it would 
be necessary for the purpose of inflicting punishment upon the accused 
to prove that he "believes" in addition to "having reason to believe". We 
cannot impute to the legislature an intention that an accused who is found 
guilty of the offence under the first paragraph would escape puni!hment 
under the succeeding paragraphs unless some additional fact or state of 
mind is proved. [324 A-DJ 
· 
(ii) If the contention of the Stale were to be accepted, the erroneous 
belief or delusion of the •ccused would furnish the. measure of punishment 
and he would be punishable under the second paragraph with imprison-
ment extending to seven years. On this interpn;tation it is possible that a 
person who removes the evidence of an offence may be liable to a heavier 
punishment than the person who committed the main offence as when the 
actual offence committed is under s. 323 but the accused under s. 201 
removes the blood-marks caused by the offence in the belief that they 
were caused by murder. It does not stand to reason that s. 201 provides 
for punishing a minor offence more severely than tho principal offence. [325 
~:01 
" 
G 
H 
• 
A 
B 
c 
D 
ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Sarkar, /.) 
317 
. 
Chinna Gangappa, In re: I.L.R. (1931) 54 Mad. 68, coosidered and 
mterpreted. 
(iii) The word "offence" wherever used in the first, second, third and 
founh paragraphs of s. 20 I means some real offence which in fai:t has 
been committed and not some offence which the accused imagines to 
have been committed. 
In the present caoe it had not been establisbed 
that the offence under s. 304 was committed by the appellants or by 
anybody else. Only offences under ss. 330 and 348 I.P.C. has been proved 
t.o have been comn\jtted. [324 G-H] 
(iv) By the same act, namely, 
burning of the dead body of Raja 
R31D, the appellants caused the evidence of two offences namely s. 330 
and 348 to disappear. 
Taking a strict view of the matter it must be 
held that by the same act the appellants committed two offences under 
•. 201. 
But normally, no court should award two separate punishments 
for the same act constituting two offences under s. 201. 
Under s. 330 
the maximum punishment is seven years' imprisonment and therefore the 
accused are liable to a max

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