ROHTAK HISSAR DISTRICT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY CO. LTD. versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS

Citation: [1966] 2 S.C.R. 863 · Decided: 03-12-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Cited by 7 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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863 
ROHTAK HISSAR DISTRICT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
CO. LTD. 
v. 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS 
December 3, 1965 
[P. 
B. 
GAJENDRAGADKAR, 
C.J., K. 
N. 
WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND 
P. 
SATYANARAYANA 
RAJU, 
JJ.] 
Standing Orders-Scope of-Jurisdictlan of Certifying 
Authorities, 
character and extent of-Jurisdiction of Court to exan1ine rearonable-
ness-Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,. 1946 (20 of 1946), 
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (28 of 1948). 
In accordance with the provisions 
of 
the 
Industrial 
Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946, 
the appellant prepared 
draft standing 
orders in consultation with its employees 
and submitted the same 
to 
the Certifying Officer for certification. 
Since 
the appellant's workers 
had not formed any union, three representatives of the \vorkmen were 
elected to represent them at the cenification proceedings. 
These repre-
sentatives took no objection to the draft standing orders submitted by the 
appellant. The Certifying Officer examined 
the reasonableness 
of the 
provisions contained in the draft Standing Orders made several changes 
in the draft and accordingly certified them. 
The appellant's appeal 
to 
the Appellate Authority was dismissed. 
In appeal by special leave, 
HELD: (i) The contention that the procedure adopted by the certi-
fying authorities in dealing with the question of the fai'rness or reaso_n-
ablene.ss of the draft Standing Orders is invalid, must fail. 
Though, originally the jurisdiction of the cettifying officer and 
the 
Appellate Authority was very 
limited,. s. 4 as amended by Act 56 of 
. 1956 has imposed upon the certifying ofllcer or th~ appellate authority 
the duty to adjudicate upon the fairness or the reasonableness of the pro-
visions of any Standing Orders and thus the jurisdiction of these autho-
rities and the scope of inquiry have become wider. The Act contemplates 
that the Standing Orders must cover matters 
initially included in 
the 
Schedule as well as matters which may be added to the Schedule by the 
appropriate Government in exercise of the authority conferred on it by 
s. 15. [867 H; 868 F] 
It cannot be said that since an elaborate machinery has been estab-
lished by the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 
1948 
any attempt by the 
certifying authorities to devise detailed provisions in respect of matters 
cove.red by the First and Second Schedules to the U.P. Act would tres-
pass upon the provisions of that Act. The scope of the provisions of the 
two Acts and the fields covered by them are not the same. While the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act purports to secure to in-
dustrial employees clear and unambiguous 
conditions 
of their employ-
ment, the scheme of the U.P. Act is to deal with problems 
posed by 
Industrial Disputes which have actually arisen or are apprehended. 
[869 
G-870 CJ 
. (ii) Consent of the employees, though relevant cannot have a deci-
s1ye significance in 
ce~tification proceedings. 
The authority has to deal 
w•!h the matt".' accordmg to its own judgment and must decide in appro-
pnate cases, hke the mstant case where the employees are not organised 
or strong enough, whether or not a particular standing order is fair or 
reasonable. [871 A-CJ 
864 
SUPREME COURT 
REPORTS 
[1966] 2 S.C.R. 
(iii) The draft Standing Orders cannot relate to matters outside the 
A 
Schedule to the Act. 
By s. 3(2) of the Act the emplayers 
have to 
frame draft Standing Orders and these must normally cover the items in 
the schedule to the Act. If, however, it 
appears to the appropriate 
autho'rities that having regard to the relevant facts and circumstances it 
would be unfair and unreasonable to make provision for 
a particular 
item, it would be competent to the authorities not to frame draft Stand-
ing Orders in that behalf, but the employer cannot insist upon adding a 
condition to the Standing Order which relates to a matter which is not 
B 
included in the Schedule. [871 F; 872 BJ 
(iv) The wording of s. 3(2) of the Act indicates that the appro-
priate authority may permit departure from the Model Standing Orders 
if it is satisfied that insistence upon such conformity may be impracti· 
cable. [872 GJ 
Associated Cement Co, Ltd. v. P. 
D. Vyas [1960J 2 S.C.R. 974 : 
[1960] 1 L.L.J. 565, referred to. 
C 
(v) The object of the Act being to require the employers to define 
with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under

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