RELIANCE CELLULOSE PRODUCTS LTD. versus OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD.
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A B C D E F G H 618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R. RELIANCE CELLULOSE PRODUCTS LTD. v. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 1110 of 2010) JULY 20, 2018 [R. F. NARIMAN AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.] Arbitration Act, 1940 - Pre-reference, pendente lite interest and future interest – Power of arbitrator to award – On facts, disputes between parties referred to arbitration with regard to price for supply of goods – Fixation of price by arbitrator and award of pre-reference, pendente lite and future interest all at the rate of 18% per annum – Reduction of the interest to 10% per annum by the Civil Judge – High Court upheld the same – On appeal, held: Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act, as well as pendente lite and future interest – However, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest – In the instant case, clause 16 of the General Conditions of Contract clearly bars payment of interest for any delay – There is nothing in this clause which refers even obliquely to the Arbitrator’s power to grant interest – There was no delay on account of the higher price as it became payable only on and from the date of the award – Even if clause 16 were to have application, both pre-reference and pendente lite interest are not barred – Only reason given for reducing interest from 18% to 10% being that ONGC is a Public Sector Undertaking, would not suffice to set aside what was within the Arbitrator’s discretion – Further, there is no finding that arbitrator exercised the discretion perversely – Thus, the grant of interest at the rate of 18% as pre-reference, pendente lite and future interest upheld – Interest Act, 1978. Allowing Reliance’s appeal and dismissing ONGC’s appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act, [2018] 6 S.C.R. 618 618 A B C D E F G H 619 1978 as well as pendente lite and future interest. However, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest. Since interest is compensatory in nature and is parasitic upon a principal sum not having been paid in time, this Court has frowned upon clauses that bar the payment of interest. It has therefore evolved the test of strict construction of such clauses, and has gone on to state that unless there is a clear and express bar to the payment of interest that can be awarded by an arbitrator, clauses which do not refer to claims before the Arbitrators or disputes between parties and clearly bar payment of interest, cannot stand in the way of an arbitrator awarding pre-reference or pendente lite interest. Thus, when one contrasts a clause such as the clause in the *Second Ambica Construction Case with the clause in **Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd., it becomes clear that unless a contractor agrees that no claim for interest will either be entertained or payable by the other party owing to dispute, difference, or misunderstandings between the parties or in respect of delay on the part of the engineer or in any other respect whatsoever, leading the Court to find an express bar against payment of interest, a clause which merely states that no interest will be payable upon amounts payable to the contractor under the contract would not be sufficient to bar an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest under the 1940 Act. As has been held in the ***First Ambica Construction Case the grant of pendente lite interest depends upon the phraseology used in the agreement, clauses conferring power relating to arbitration, the nature of claim and dispute referred to the Arbitrator, and on what items the power to award interest has been taken away and for which period. The position as explained in some of the judgments under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, is wholly different, inasmuch as Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act sanctifies agreements between the parties and states that the moment the agreement says otherwise, no interest becomes payable right from the date of the cause of action until the award is delivered. [Para 22] [645-D-H; 646-A-C] 1.2 In the instant case, clause 16 of the General Conditions of Contract only speaks of any delay in payment not making ONGC RELIANCE CELLULOSE
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