REEMA AGGARWAL versus ANUPAM AND ORS.

Citation: [2004] 1 S.C.R. 378 · Decided: 08-01-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
REEMA AGGARWAL 
V. 
ANUPAM AND ORS. 
JANUARY 8, 2004. 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860-Sections 3048, 307 and 498A-Husband marrying 
victim during lifetime of first wife-Dowry demand by husband and his parents 
C and brother causing harassment to victim-Prosecution for offences-
Prosecution failing to establish that first marriage legally dissolved, acquitled 
by trial court-Dismissal of application for grant of leave as well as revision 
by High Court by cryptic orders-On appeal held: In view of the object and 
aim of the legislation in introducing Section 498A and 3048, expression 
'husband' does not exclude persosn who contracts marriage ostensibly and 
D cohabit with such women and so the provisions do not presuppose valid 
marriage-Order of High Court not justified and matter remitted back to High 
Court. 
DoWIJ' Prohibition Act, 1961-Sections 2 and 4-Dowry-Scope of-
Held: Expression covers demand of money, property or valuable security 
E given as consideration for marriage, before, at or after marriage-Mere demand 
also covered-However, voluntary giving of traditional presents to bride or 
bridegroom by friends and relatives out of love, affection or regard not 
inc/uded-Furthei·more, marriage in this context would include a proposed 
marriage also. 
F 
Appellant-wife married respondent-husband during the life time of 
the first wife of the respondent. After the marriage, respondent, his parents 
and brother harassed the appellant for dowry. On the date of the incident 
they forced her to consume something to end her life. Thereafter, the 
appellant was admitted to the hospital where she stated all this to the 
G investigating officer. Charges were framed for offences punishable under 
Sections 307 and 498A IPC. Prosecution failed to establish that the first 
marriage of respondent had dissolved legally. Trial Court held that the 
accusations under Section 307 and also the charge under Section 498A was 
not established and acquitted the accused. State filed application for grant 
of leave to appeal. High Court dismissed the application. Criminal revision 
H 
378 
... ,
REEMA AGGARWAL v. ANUPAM 
379 
,, -~ 
application was also dismissed. Hence the present appeal. 
A 
Appellant-wife contended that the High Court was not justified to 
dispose of the application for grant of leave as well as the revision 
application .by such cryptic orders. 
Respondent-husband contended that marriage is a legal union of one B 
man and woman as husband and wife and cannot extend to a woman 
whose marriage is void and not a valid marriage in the eye of law; that 
under Sections S(i), 11 and 16 of Hindu Marriage Act the legislature has 
taken care by providing for contingencies flowing from void or voidable 
marriages but, there is no such indication in Section 498-A IPC; and that c 
the language used under Section 498-A IPC is 'husband or relative of the 
husband'. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The Dowry Act is a piece of social legislation which aims D 
to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes 
-,,., 
punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand 
~ 
of dowry. The expression "dowry" under the Dowry Act has to be 
interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it. The 
definition given in the statute is the determinative factor. The definition 
of the term 'dowry' under Section 2 of the Dowry Act includes any money, E 
property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given" either directly 
or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the 
marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the 
marriage of the said parties". Under Section 4, mere demand of 'dowry' 
would fall within the mischief of 'dowry' under the Act where such demand F 
is not properly referable to any legally recognized claim a1Jd is relatable 
~1 
only to the consideration of marriage. Thus, dowry as a quid pro quo for 
_J 
marriage is prohibited. However, the voluntary giving of traditional 
presents to the bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives at or 
before or after the marriage not as a consideration for marriage but out 
of love, affection or regard does not fall within the mischief of the G 
expression 'dowry' made punishable under the Dowry Act. Marriage in 
this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly 
... 
where the non-fulfillment of the "demand 

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