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RAVI DHINGRA versus THE STATE OF HARYANA

Citation: [2023] 2 S.C.R. 164 · Decided: 01-03-2023 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 2 S.C.R.
RAVI DHINGRA
v.
THE STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2009)
MARCH 01, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.364A, 363 and 364 – Modification of
conviction u/s.364A to s.363 – Appellants convicted u/ss.148, 364A
r/w s.149, IPC – Sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3
years u/s.148, rigorous imprisonment for life and fine u/s.364A r/w
s.149 – On appeal, held: s.364A has three components- kidnapping
or abduction of a person and keeping them in detention; threat to
cause death or hurt, and the use of kidnapping, abduction, or
detention with a demand to pay the ransom; and when the demand
is not met, then causing death – In the present case, there are two
statements of PW-21-child victim, one made to the police 2 days
after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants and
another made before the Trial Court, two years after the initial
statement – Three changes are noticed therein, first, a change in
the exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery
of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the
threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying out – These details are
crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge u/s.364A i.e,
‘threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that
such person may be put to death or hurt’ – Thus, this ingredient was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt – For proving the ingredient
of threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of
making him silent cannot be enough – If the sentence carrying a
maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life sentence
has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference between
punishments for kidnapping u/ss.363, 364 and 364A shall become
meaningless – Conviction of the appellants u/s.364A is unsustainable
– Appellants convicted u/s.363 and sentenced to imprisonment for
seven years with fine – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.216.
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 164
164
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Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Section 363 of the IPC punishes the act of
kidnapping and Section 364 thereof punishes the offence of
kidnapping or abduction of a person in order to murder him.
Section 364A further adds to the gravity of the offence by involving
an instance of coercive violence or substantial threat thereof, to
make a demand for ransom. Accordingly, the maximum
punishment for the three crimes is seven years imprisonment;
ten years’ imprisonment and imprisonment for life or death,
respectively. Under section 364A, it is necessary to prove not
only that such kidnapping or abduction has taken place but that
thereafter, the accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such
person or by his conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt or cause hurt or
death to such person in order to compel the Government or any
foreign State or international, inter-governmental organization or
any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom. [Paras 12 and 13][173-F-G; 176-E-F]
Lohit Kaushal v. State of Haryana (2009) 17 SCC 106;
Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu (2006) 13 SCC
36 : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 466; Vishwanath Gupta v.
State of Uttaranchal (2007) 11 SCC 633 : [2007] 4
SCR 332; Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 SCC
502 : [2015] 10 SCR 816 – relied on.
1.2 The Courts below, as is usual in kidnapping cases, have
placed singular reliance on the testimony of PW-21 to prove the
element of ‘threat to cause death or hurt’, or to determine whether
the appellants’ conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person may be put to death or hurt. The statement of
PW-21 made to the police on 18.02.2000, i.e., two days after he
had returned home from the captivity of appellants herein records
that he was threatened at night by the appellants with a ‘revolver,’
which was claimed to be possessed by them. The exact statement
was, “One handkerchief and one black cloth were tied on the eyes
and said to me they have revolver and they will kill him if [he]
raises any voice.” However, the statement before the Trial Court
dated 15.04.2002, nearly two years after the initial statement,
includes a substantial detail that was omitted in the previous
RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 2 S.C.R.
statement. After mentioning that the PW-21 was forcibly pu

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