LexRATTAN LAL versus VARDESH CHANDER & ORS
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A B c D E F G H 906 RATTAN LAL v. V ARDESH CHANDER & ORS December 9, 1975 (Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.] Transfer of Property Act-Secs. 106 and lll(a) and lll(g)-Eviction under Rent Control Law-Whether de hors Transfer of Property Act-Rules of Justice equity and good conscience-Whether institutidn of legal proceedings operates ~ as determination of lease-Art. 133 of Constitution-If certificate limited to a pal"ticular point-Whether other points can be argued-Whether English con- cepts to be blindly followed. ~ The respondent landlord let out the building in question to the appellant 1 tenant in the year 1954, when the Transfer of Property Act was not appli.cable to Delhi where the property is situated. The Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to Delhi i.n the year 1962. In 1967, the respondent filed a suit for eviction against the appellant without terminating the tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act on the grounds of unauthorised subletting and acquisition of alternative accommodation by the· tenant. A decree for eviction was passed by the Rent Controller which was affirmed by the ,l\ppellate Tribu- nal. In the High Court it was contended by the appellant that neither notice to quit nor notice of forfeiture determining the tenancy was giYen by the landlord as required by sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The respondent contended that the lease had expired by efflux of time under secticn 111 (a) and no notice terminating the tenancy was necessary and that forfeiture of the tenancy caused by the subletting contrary to the terms of the agreement can be availed of by the landlord even in the absence of a notice as contem- plated by section 111 (g). The High Court dismi~ the petition filed by the appellant but granted a certificate of fitness under Article 133 restricting it to one grouncl ur11Cd before the High Court. The respondent raised a preliminarY objection that since the certificate was granted only on oue point the appel- lant could not be permitted to make any other submissions. The appellant contenued that the lease is one where the time is not limited and, therefore, is terminable only by 15 days notice as required by section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. The respondent contended that the lease was for a fixed period and expired by efflux of time. Jn any event a notice in writing is not necessary to terminate the leas·~. Institution of legal proceedings serves that purpose. HELD : (1) Once a certificate of fitness has been granted under Article 133, the appeal. in all its amplitude, is before the Court -and every point may be urged by the appellant provided this Court permits it haYing regard to the circumstances. It is however, within the court's discretion not to allow a new point to be taken up. [909D-El (2) The scheme of the Rent Control Law, is to put farther fetters on landlords seeking eviction where in the absence of such acute barriers the landlords would be entitled to ejectment. Even wbere under a particular Rent Control Statute the landlord makes out grannds for eviction he can institure pro- ceedings in this behalf only if de hors the said grounds he has cause of action under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord cannot secure an order for eviction without first establishin!! that he has validly determined the lease under the transfer of Property Act. [909G-H, 91 lC] (3) A lease merely stating that it is for a period Iese than one year is ex-facie for an indefinite period and as such cannot expire by effinx of time. , - f )' j RATTAN LAL v. v. CHANDER (Krishna Iyer, J.) 907 Nor are we convinced that the acceptance of rent for the period of 11 years A does not amount assenting to the holding over of the tenancy by the land- lord. f911E-Fl ( 4) The Rent Act contemplates no elaborate proceedings but filling out. of the particulars in a proforma which takes the place of a plaint. No spec1ryc a~rment of forfeiture and consequent determination of the lease is found m ~he petition. The question arises whether a written notice of forfeiture for the breach of the condition of the lease is obligatory in terms of section U l(g) or whether written notice of forfeiture can be dispensed with as being no part of the equity or justice but a technical or formal statutory requirement. Be- fore the amendment of Transfer of Property Act in !929 all that was neces- s
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